136 



I believe that our policy makers must carefully consider the history of Fraser River 

 salmon conservation and allocation, if the United States is to arrive at a fair and reasonable 

 negotiating position for a future regime, and is to have any real prospect of contending 

 successfully with the Canadian strategy and tactics. There are very important lessons to 

 be learned. The danger is, of course, that in failing to recognize where we have been 

 correct or in error, we will miss important opportunities and make otherwise avoidable 

 mistakes. 



The Fraser River Convention of 1930, which was superceded by the Pacific 

 Salmon Treaty, provided that, not only the conservation and management burdens, but 

 also the harvest benefits, should be shared equally between the United States and Canada. 

 This accorded with the fact that the U.S. made large commitments of tax dollars to 

 restoration, management, and enhancement of the stocks and maintained conservation 

 restrictions on domestic commercial and tribal fisheries. However, by increasingly 

 prosecuting fisheries outside the Convention area, Canada succeeded in reducing the U.S. 

 share to well below 50%. The United States paid a high price for its failure to insist that 

 Canada abandon a strategy that effectively undermined our right to an equal share of the 



Under the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the United States accepted a much reduced share 

 of the Fraser River salmon harvests. In the first four years of the new regime, 1985-1988, 

 the Fraser River Annex provided the U.S. with 27.1% of the sockeye salmon total 

 allowable catch ("TAC") and 313% of the pink salmon TAC. In the second four years, 

 1989-1992, the Annex provided the U.S. with 26 1% of the sockeye TAC and 25.7 % of 

 the pink TAC, based on preliminary expectations of the TAC, and subject to maximum 

 aggregate catches of 7.0 million sockeye and 7 2 million pinks. 



