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10 



than one-half of the funding for the Pacific Salmon Commission. Taxpayer-supported 

 Washington State and federal enforcement, combined with well-managed, pollution-free 

 waters, provided safe passage for the millions of Fraser salmon during their migrations. 



It is very important to recognize that Fraser River salmon spend 60% of their 

 life cycles in United States waters. This is a point that we failed to assert with sufficient 

 forcefijlness in the negotiation of the original Treaty annexes. 



In 1992, the Pacific Salmon Commission undertook to develop a new regime for 

 Fraser River salmon and to address various other fisheries issues, including those involving 

 coho and chinook. Unfortunately, Canada maintained the objective of severely restricting 

 U.S. harvests of Fraser River salmon, and showed little interest in curtailing Canadian 

 interceptions of U.S. salmon, coho in particular. At the same time, Canada sought to 

 negotiate new constraints on Alaskan salmon fisheries, although the relevant annexes were 

 not to expire until 1994. 



The strategy of resisting constraints on coho interceptions and pressuring for early 

 concessions in Alaskan fisheries led to a collapse of the effort to secure a long-term 

 regime for the Fraser salmon fisheries and Canadian interceptions of coho, those issues 

 were settled for a single year, only. No results were achieved with respect to the Alaskan 

 fisheries. 



The single substantive achievement by the United States in the 1992/93 

 negotiations was having won renewed Canadian acceptance of an essentially abundance- 

 based approach to the sharing of Fraser River salmon harvests. For the 1993 regime, as 

 for the original four-year regime of the Treaty, the United States share was effectively 

 constrained, not by artificial catch ceilings, but by percentages of the catch This reflected 



