139 



11 



the provision of Article III, paragraph 3 (c) of the Treaty establishing that annual 

 variations in abundance should be taken into account, thereby providing a basis upon 

 which to share the harvest in a manner that would reasonably reflect contributions to the 

 successful conservation of the salmon stocks. A constraining ceiling, by its very nature, 

 would preclude a full reward for conservation and management contributions leading to 

 increased abundances. 



Specifically, the regime for the Eraser River salmon in 1993 provided for a U.S. 

 harvest share of 20% of the forecast sockeye TAC, and then 10% and 5% of higher TAC 

 levels. A record run size— which could not have occured in the absence of major U.S. 

 contributions to the restoration and continued heaUh of the fisheries—produced a U.S. 

 harvest goal of 2.763 million fish in Washington State waters. As anticipated, an artificial 

 catch ceiling of 2.806 million fish did not constrain the actual catch, which was for various 

 reasons, 2.692 million fish. 



The run size in 1993 was so large that the actual share of the harvest enjoyed by 

 the U.S. was only 15.8% of the TAC. Thus, although the regime was an advance for the 

 United States over that provided in the previous four years, the actual, resulting harvest 

 level was far fi"om fair in relation to U.S. contributions to the fisheries. 



Several statistics are worthy of close attention. Average annual run sizes for the 

 four-year cycle prior to the Treaty were slightly over 8 million. During the first four-year 

 regime, the annual average run sizes increased to over 10 million. The second four-year 

 average exceeded 12 million. The run for 1993 reached 22.5 million, the highest level on 

 this cycle since 1913, when the run size was approximately 40 million~and the Hell's Gate 

 rock slide decimated the fisheries for decades to follow. The annual average run sizes for 

 the period, 1994-1998, are estimated at 21.4 million. 



