145 



17 



issue which was volatile at the time of the Treaty negotiations, but which has since been 

 resolved. 



In the 1992/93 and 1993/94 negotiations, based on the above-quoted language that 

 had a very different intent when originally negotiated, Canada pressured the U.S. to count 

 the Fraser sockeye harvested in Alaska against the 1989-1992 seven million ceiling on the 

 U.S. Fraser harvest. Canada relented on this point only with great reluctance. Notably, 

 Canada was not prepared to make substantial concessions regarding the accounting for its 

 own, ever-expanding recreational catch of U.S. coho and chinook off the west coast of 

 Vancouver Island. 



The Management of U.S. Salmon Fisheries in the Northern Boundary Area 



In the negotiations on the original annexes to the Treaty, Canada made a major 

 issue of the small number of interceptions of Fraser River sockeye by U.S. fishermen 

 (many of whom are Washington residents) in the Northern Boundary Area. In effect, 

 Canada maintained that the massive U.S. pink salmon fishery should be managed to reduce 

 those interceptions. The United States disagreed, and its position was reflected in the 

 outcome of the Treaty negotiations 



It is important that the Letter of Submittal, referred to earlier in my statement, 

 contains language clearly enunciating the U.S. interpretation of the Treaty as it affects the 

 Northern Island Boundary Area. As noted in the Letter of Submittal, fishing in that area 

 has characteristics which make management difficult. Stocks of both United States and 

 Canadian origin broadly intermingle on the fishing grounds. The Treaty reflects a 

 recognition of these facts The Letter of Submittal addresses the matter directly and in 

 detail. 



