147 



19 



There is no evidence that the implemented trade-offs advanced U.S. coho interests 

 in any signficant way. Prior to the Treaty, Canada took some 2 million coho off the West 

 Coast of Vancouver Island; that fell to 1.8 million until 1993. The limit on Canadian 

 interceptions last year was 1.7 million coho, but the actual catch was under 1 million. 

 Despite the greatly reduced Canadian interceptions, there was no appreciable 

 improvement in the Washington coho fisheries This meant that the United States neither 

 fully benefited from the large Fraser sockeye runs, nor gained materially from lower 

 Canadian interceptions of coho 



From the experience of the 1993 fisheries, the inescapable conclusion is that 

 reducing Canadian interceptions will not solve the U.S. coho problem. Reports from the 

 1994 season confirm this. Trading sockeye for coho will simply throw away fish upon 

 which Washington fishermen depend to support their families and their communities. This 

 must be avoided in future negotiations. 



The United States economy and the local conditions in Washington State do not 

 allow the luxury of costly concessions to Canada in the salmon negotiations. The 

 abundance-based management provision of the Treaty, the history of investments by U.S. 

 taxpayers and of participation by U.S. fishermen in the Fraser River salmon fisheries, and 

 the interest in maintaining an incentive for conservation of the salmon stocks and 

 protection of their habitat, are not compatible with Canadian demands for a greater 

 restriction on US harvests. 



There is no justification for reducing our harvests in fisheries experiencing record 

 salmon populations to which U.S. contributions have been longstanding, substantial, and 

 indispensable. Constraints on harvests have been endured in the lean years, and now, all 



