148 



20 



fishermen should share in an equitable way the benefits of what must be regarded as a rare 

 environmental success story. By the same token, these fisheries have not been a cause of 

 the problems suffered by other salmon populations (including those listed under the 

 Endangered Species Act), and should not be used as trading stock for attempts at finding 

 solutions. In the particular case of coho, the experience of 1993 shows that any politically 

 realistic constraint on Canada will have no material effect on harvests in the United States. 



The Fraser River and Northern Boundary Area salmon harvests provide 

 Washington with some of its most valuable commercial fisheries. Nearly 2000 

 Washington residents (exclusive of tribal commercial fishermen) hold commercial fishing 

 permits for salmon fisheries in the waters of Puget Sound and southeastern Alaska. These 

 fisheries are subject to the terms of the Treaty. In addition, thousands of Washington 

 residents crew on vessels operated by these permit holders. Over 50 salmon processing 

 companies with corporate offices in Washington rely on these fisheries, as do hundreds of 

 other Washington businesses. 



Ill-considered trade-offs or corrections of "inequity", as demanded by Canada, 

 resulting in a reduction of the U.S. fisheries on the Fraser River salmon would be felt 

 through the Pacific Northwest economy. Any curtailment of the Alaskan fisheries, in an 

 attempt to reduce interceptions of Canadian sockeye, would sacrifice the harvest of 

 massive quantities of U.S. salmon, but actually allow the escape of a relatively small 

 number of Canadian fish. This, too, could have a severe impact on Washington residents 

 who fish in Alaskan waters. 



I feel I must repeat the fundamental lesson to be learned from the history of the 

 Pacific Salmon Treaty negotiations. The Treaty was successfijUy concluded, only after the 

 United States Delegation committed itself to a patient process of developing negotiating 



