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would not be immediately possible to determine with certainty the 

 total production of salmon from the rivers of each country. The 

 Parties also recognize that methods differ for evaluating 

 benefits accruing within each country. For these reasons, the 

 Parties anticipate that it would be some time before the 

 Commission could discern that a trend had developed, and 

 ascertain the value of benefits due each Party under Article 

 III(l) (b). 



The Commission will have the complex task of developing 

 programs to address any inequity and provide for any appropriate 

 adjustment to implement the provisions of Article III(l)(b), The 

 Treaty establishes three precepts that are to guide the Parties 

 in their implementation of the principles of conservation and 

 equity. Initially, Article 111(3) (a) requires the Commission, 

 when considering equity adjustments, to recognize the 

 desirability of reducing interceptions. This precept recognizes 

 that excessively high interception rates may result in 

 conservation problems and reduce incentives to enhance resource 

 production. However, such reductions cannot be mandated in all 

 cases, because they will not always be fair or feasible. In the 

 northern boundary area, for example, since stocks are of both 

 Canadian and United States origin and cannot be segregated, the 

 United States fishery targeted on United States-origin salmon 

 must involve an incidental catch Canadian-origin sockeye. 

 Similarly, the Canadian fishery for Canadian-origin sockeye and 

 pink salmon intercepts substantial numbers of U.S. pink salmon. 



