176 



Vlll 



Article III, discussed above, establishes the principles that govern 

 operation of the Commission and this treaty. The underlying prin- 

 ciples are two-fold: to conduct fisheries and enhancement programs 

 to provide for conservation and optimum production and two, to 

 "provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the pro- 

 duction of salmon originating in its waters" — the equity principle. 

 The Parties harbor no illusions that the equity principle will be 

 simple to quantify . In adopting this provision, the Parties, by 

 Memorandum of Understanding to the treaty, have recognized ex- 

 pressly that levels of interceptions will vary annually and oyer 

 time , that data on the extent of interceptions in some areas are im- 

 precise, and that it would not be immediately possible to determine 

 with certainty the total production of salmon from each country's 

 rivers. They also recognized that methods of evaluating benefits ac- 

 cruing within each country differ . For these reasons, the Parties 

 anticipated that it would be some time before the Commission 

 could discern that a trend has developed and ascertain the value of 

 benefits due each Party under Article III (l)(b). 



The Commission will have the equally complex task of develop- 

 ing programs to adjust any inequity and provide for any appropri- 

 ate adjustment to implement the provisions of Article III (l)(b). The 

 treaty establishes t hree precepts that are to guide the Parties in 

 their implementation of these twin principles of conservation and 

 equity . Initially, Article III (3)(aj requires the Commission, when 

 considering equity adjustments, to recognize the desirability of re- 

 ducing interceptions. This precept recognizes that excessively high 

 interception rates may result in conservation problems and reduce 

 incentives to enhance resource production. However, such reduc- 

 tions cannot be mandated in all cases because they will not always 

 be fair or feasible. In the northern boundary area, for example, 

 since stocks are of both Canadian and United States origin and 

 cannot be segregated, the United States fishery targeted on United 

 States-origin salmon must catch Canadian-ori^n sockeye in an ir> 

 cidentai manner. Similarly, the Canadian lishery for Canadian- 

 origin sockeye and pink salmon intercepts substantial numbers of 

 United States pink salmon. A reduction in interception levels 

 would preclude a Party from targeting on its own stocks. This 

 would be plainly contrary to the Parties' objective. 



Therefore, to balance the concern with reducing interceptions, 

 Article III (3)rb) further instructs the Commission to consiaer a 

 second important concept: the desirability of avoiding undue dis- 

 ruption of existing fisheries. This protects several United btates 

 fisheries from undue social or economic dislocation as a result of 

 equity adjustments. In the northern boundary area, the exarnpTe 

 cited above, historic United States fisheries targeting on United 

 States stocks could not be shut down in order to reduce intercep - 

 tions. In the case of the Fraser River, a fishery developed and man - 

 aged jointly by the Parties since the i930's^ Canada affirmed that Tt 

 has no intention of closing down a historic United States fishery! 

 Article 111 (3)(b) provides these fisheries an assurance that the Com- 

 mission will seek to nvnid thp sorial and prnnnmir Hislnratinns nf 

 major adjustments, 



Finally, Article III (3Xc) exhorts the Commission when perform- 

 ing equity calculations, to note that seasonal variations in stocks 



