tion to this preventive aspect, TSCA also gave the EPA the more 

 traditional end of the pipe regulatory authority. If TSCA's creators 

 intended the statute to support numerous rules restricting or ban- 

 ning specific chemicals, they would certainly be disappointed at the 

 results. 



TSCA has, in some ways, been a statute with a good deal of au- 

 thority, with some inherent contradictions that obscure its mission. 

 It gives the EPA the authority to require chemical testing but pro- 

 vides cumbersome processes. Although recognizing the industry's 

 responsibility for testing, its incentives reward ignorance. 



TSCA gives the EPA a broad range of options to control chemical 

 risks through actions ranging from labeling to bans, but, again, the 

 process is extremely cumbersome. It gives the EPA extensive au- 

 thority to collect health and safety information, but it greatly inhib- 

 its dissemination of that information by allowing broad confiden- 

 tiality claims. TSCA appears to need a clearer sense of its mission 

 and more streamline processes. 



Recent EPA actions have shown some of the potential of TSCA. 

 Recently, the EPA has emphasized its information gathering au- 

 thorities, and, in combination with some more recent actions like 

 the Pollution Prevention Act and APRA, has sought out pollution 

 prevention strategies. Yet, it almost seems that this effective TSCA 

 work comes in spite of the statute rather than because of it. 



We'll hear witnesses today talk about cooperative efforts between 

 the EPA and industry to consider environmental effects of their 

 manufacturing decisions at a very early stage — ^that is, to design 

 for the environment. The EPA has worked with industry to encour- 

 age the use of chemicals and materials that avoid or reduce haz- 

 ardous chemicals. These are important efforts but often voluntary 

 actions are affected because of the realistic prospect of regulation. 

 We have to see that the EPA has the ability to remove severe risks 

 when appropriate. 



As we've seen with the success of TRI, another important incen- 

 tive for industries is to take responsibility for its activities in public 

 accountability. Recognizing that industry has a legitimate and im- 

 portant interest in keeping confidential information that would af- 

 fect its competitive position, we must allow the public to obtain 

 health and safety information of the chemicals that they are ex- 

 posed to. 



Moreover, information is essential for companies using chemicals 

 to manufacture other products so they can choose safer chemicals 

 and process and produce the environmental friendly products that 

 more consumers are demanding. To some extent today, we'll talk 

 about the familiar negatives that have always come up in the past 

 when TSCA is the topic, the slowness in issuing test drills, so few 

 section 6 regulations, and the need for priorities and reviewing ex- 

 isting chemicals. But today we'll also want to start a more positive 

 dialogue — ask not just what TSCA hasn't done but what it should 

 do. 



I'm looking forward to hearing our witnesses on these matters. 



Congressman Synar, I really appreciate your being here today. 

 This committee room on occasion is packed. There are TV cameras 

 all over, people waiting in the back of the room, and, frankly, the 

 importance of those hearings is much less than this one today. It 



