69 



However, the SNUR program has also failed to foster a truly preventive program 

 towards chemicfils. EPA has not utilized SNURs in a coherent policy of chemicals 

 management, but rather SNURs have been deployed when it was decided not to in- 

 vest resources in stronger regulatory actions. 



Moreover, EPA has not integrated any surveillance system into the SNUR con- 

 cept. That is, EPA has not attempted to utilize data on trends of chemical levels 

 in humans or the environment to trigger an analysis of possible changes in exposure 

 that could be captured by a SNUR. 



4. TSCA's Relationship to Other Statutes 



In order to facilitate use of TSCA as a pollution prevention tool, it is especially 

 important that Congress revamp Section 9 of TSCA, "Relationship to other Federal 

 laws." The current wording, as historically interpreted by EPA, limits reliance on 

 TSCA to instances where the EPA Administrator determines that no other program 

 administered by another agency or by EPA will suflBce. At times, EPA has inter- 

 preted this language as a "TSCA-if-all-else-fails" presumption, one that has on occa- 

 sion prompted a wasteful debate over whether all else actually fails, or as a way 

 to escape responsibility for action, as in the glycol ethers issue. 



EDF is at a loss to identify any logical or policy basis for this discriminating 

 against TSCA. When efficient risk reduction can be accomplished by the coordinated 

 efforts of more than one agency, TSCA should allow for referral; even then, however, 

 the unique powers of TSCA — as an information generating statute and as the only 

 statute that extends back to production and forward through ultimate disposal — 

 should not be disregarded. It may be appropriate for the Occupational Safety and 

 Health Administration (OSHA) and the Consumer Products Safety Commission 

 (CPSC) to use their authorities to control those aspects of chemical cycling which 

 affect workers or consumers, but only EPA can deal with releases from the work- 

 place, disposal, inadvertent generation, and other aspects of chemical production 

 and use which may add significantly to the overall exposures and risks of the popu- 

 lation. 



Accordingly, Congress should amend section 9 to make clear that it presents no 

 barrier to use of whichever tool is best suited for the task at hand, without the need 

 for going through the unwieldy process now called for by both the interagency refer- 

 ral provisions of section 9(a) and the internal provisions of section 9(b). Specifically, 

 section 9(a) should be amended to direct EPA to refer a matter to cinother agency 

 upon determining that the risk can more effectively be addressed by that agency. 

 Such an approach appropriately allows EPA to consider issues of agency resources 

 and expertise (Its own and others) as well as other relevant factors, and makes clear 

 that the key issue is one of achieving results. 



Similarly, the egregiously convoluted second sentence of section 9(b) should be en- 

 tirely discarded. To promote integration with other EPA programs, a much more 

 straightforward approach should be adopted. Indeed, the first sentence of section 

 9(b) appears to suffice by itself If additional detail is felt to be necessary, the lan- 

 guage of section 1006(b) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA, 42 

 U.S.C. section 6905(b)) may offer a useful model. 



This analysis is important not only for the assessment of risks as part of TSCA 

 but also for the development of integrated policy response. Thus, as with PCBs, 

 TSCA is uniquely powerful in addressing chemicals that present risks in many 

 media, from many sources, at many stage of production, use and disposal; TSCA ac- 

 tion may be driven by the finding of unreasonable risk at any stage in this process 

 or by the finding of unreasonable risk as a consequence of the sum of all risks. Un- 

 fortunately, as noted below. Congress must reassert the holistic nature of TSCA 

 analysis and action through changes to TSCA's procedural and judicial provisions 

 as well as to section 9. 



5. Decision Criteria, Standard of Review, and Rulemaking Procedures 



In part, blame for TSCA's ineffectuality— particularly with regard to section 6 — 

 must be shared by Congress. While EPA (at least until recently) has interpreted the 

 statutory language to exacerbate its own difficulties in proceeding under the statute, 

 the language itself creates several obstacles to achieving TSCA's loft;y yet sensible 



