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Statement of Warren R. Muir, Senior Fellow, INFORM 



Chairman Reid and Senators: It is an honor and great pleasure to appear before 

 your subcommittee today to discuss issues concerning toxic chemicals in commerce 

 and to offer a vision of a reformed Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). I hope that 

 these hearings will lead to significant Congressional debate and major revisions to 

 a potentially important law to guide all involved with toxic chemicals in commerce. 



I am a chemist, with post-doctoral training in public health (epidemiology). I am 

 a Senior Fellow with INFORM, a New York City-based nonprofit environmental re- 

 search firm, known for its case study research and reporting. The Chemical Hazards 

 Prevention Program of INFORM, of which I have been the senior member since 

 1982, received the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Administrator's Award 

 in 1992. I have co-authored two major INFORM books and numerous other publica- 

 tions, with a special focus on the pollution prevention practices of the organic chemi- 

 cal industry. 



I am also President of the Hampshire Research Institute, a 501(c)(3) scientific and 

 education organization, and its smaller consulting affiliate, Hampshire Research As- 

 sociates, Inc. (referred to collectively as Hampshire Research). Located in Alexan- 

 dria, Virginia, Hampshire Research is a small group of highly trained scientists, en- 

 gineers, and computer programmers that over the past 13 years have dedicated 

 their expertise to promoting environmental quality by bridging the gap from science 

 and engineering to public poUcy and to public understanding. Our work is sponsored 

 almost entirely by government programs, international bodies, and environmental 

 public interest organizations. Hampshire Research focuses on environmental issues 

 relating to toxic chemicals and hazardous waste. Our programs emphasize toxic 

 chemical and hazardous waste pollution prevention, environmental data policies and 

 analyses, and chemical risk assessment. We are the developers and distributors of 

 RISK* ASSISTANT TM, microcomputer-based risk assessment software, with reg- 

 istered users in more than 20 countries around the world. 



I have been involved with issues of toxic chemicals in commerce and toxic sub- 

 stances public policy my entire professional career. I have been both a participant 

 in and close observer of the TSCA program from the start. In 1971, I joined the 

 President' Council on Environmental Quality, which in that year spearheaded the 

 first proposal for Federal TSCA legislation. As a Senior Staff member, I was the 

 lead individual helping the Council to coordinate Administration policy on the legis- 

 lation through three Congresses, until its final enactment at the end of 1976. In 

 1977, I moved to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, where I became the 

 Deputy Assistant Administrator for Testing and Evaluation (the scientific and engi- 

 neering office of the three offices implementing TSCA) and subsequently became the 

 first Director of the Office of Toxic Substances (which combined the three imple- 

 menting offices into one). Since my retirement fi-om the career Federal service in 

 1981, I have served in the capacities mentioned above and as a member of the fac- 

 ulty of the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health. 



WHAT proponents EXPECTED TSCA TO ACCOMPLISH 



When Congress first considered TSCA in the 1970s, the proposal was regarded by 

 those working on it as the first representative of a new generation of environmental 

 legislation. It offered EPA extensive authority and discretion, and it based most de- 

 cisions on a trade-off between risk and benefits. The common wisdom was that the 

 broad reporting provisions of Section 8, the broad testing authorities of Section 4, 

 and the broad controls available in Section 6 represented cutting-edge thinking in 

 environmental policy. TSCA's first proponents expected reporting, testing, and regu- 

 lating to work-and to work well-in reducing and eliminating chemical-based environ- 

 mental risks, once the legislation was enacted. 



Only the new chemical review provisions of Section 5 aroused great controversy, 

 preventing consensus through three Congresses. When great controversy finally 

 yielded to great compromise in 1976, few, if any, believed Section 5 would work. 

 Most thought that the new-chemical provisions would fail in practice and would 

 have to be reconsidered, but supported enactment to put into effect those other im- 

 portant provisions that were virtually assured of success. 



