12 OCEAN SCIENCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 



tons rose to 79 milJion tons of cargo in 1944. However, 733 American 

 merchant ships were lost to enemy action. 



In the Pacific, the Japanese Empire lost 4,861,000 tons of merchant 

 shipping due to U.S. submarine action. The subsequent retraction 

 of the overextended Japanese Empire proved the critical significance 

 of control over the seas. At that time, incidentally, although ultimate 

 capitulation was brought about by a dual American thi-eat from the 

 air as well from the sea, American planes were operating from overseas 

 bases initially captm-ed by naval supported forces and supplied mainly 

 by surface shipping. 



In fact, World War II dramatically proved the significance of 

 seapower and with the revival of American naval strength after the 

 critical losses at Pearl Harbor, the United States fought the war in 

 the Pacific not only with conventional tactics, but also with striking 

 innovations. Naval warfare became a inultidimensional rather than a 

 two-dimensional theater of operations; for the Navy, the ah over the 

 sea and the water beneath became closel}^ integrated through sophis- 

 ticated combat teams employing sophisticated techniques. 



As a matter of national policy, the United States has resolved to 

 maintain its supremacy in seapower. 



On the contemporar}^ scene, the Soviet Union, the chief antagonist 

 of the United States in peace and potential adversary in war, controls 

 a heartland position with a vast contiguous and monolithic land mass. 

 In contrast, the free world is fragmented, scattered around the rim of 

 the Eurasian continent and separated by large oceans and sea routes. 

 Tlie bivalent characteristics of the oceans give the free world distinct 

 advantages so long as a dominant balance of seapower is maintained; 

 but, if control of tlie sea declines while that of the Communist world 

 is strengthened, the oceans then become the medium by which the free 

 world may be divided. To underscore this point, in 1957 the total 

 bulk transportation by ship was 250 billion ton-miles, which represents 

 99.5 percent of total tonnage moved by all means of transportation. 



As a digression, statements of many national leaders may be recalled 

 concerning the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine. Only about 

 14 percent of our own foreign trade is carried in our ships. Projected 

 construction plans do not promise to offset the obsolescence of the 

 present merchant fleet of 1,035 ships, of which only 206 have been 

 built during the last 15 years.^ The most promising means for realizing 

 a self-supporting U.S. Merchant Marine that can compete successfully 

 in the world market has been said to lie in further mechanization, 

 automation, and improvements in design and ship construction which, 

 in turn, depend on research including oceanography.^ 



The roles, missions, responsibilities and prerogatives of the II. S. 

 Navy in support of global connnitments are clear. The Polaris pro- 

 gram is a significant factor as a deterrent, but seapower has been at 

 the very heart of our foreign polic}' with fleet elements deployed in 

 the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Far East. Adm. Arleigh 

 Burke, before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, has noted : 



The U.S. Navy exists for two primary reasons. First, the Navy's task in cold 

 war is to support the foreign policy of the United States in widely separated areas 

 of the world. Second, the Navy's" task in hot war is to control the ns-e of the seas 

 for U.S. purposes and deny theiV use to the enemy. In this role, the Navy must 



'"An Introductory Survey of Some of the Considerations That Influence the U.S. Naval Shipbuilding 

 Program," January I960, by ,T. H. Probus, Committee on Undersea Warfare, NAS-NEC. 

 * ' Project Walrus" Report of IMarltimo Research Advisory Commitfee, NAS-NRC. 



