OCEAN SCIENCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 13 



control the sea approaches to the Western Hemisphere;; supply and support the 

 overseas operations of ground and air forces; maintain communications with 

 friendly and allied nations around the world; and maintain conmiunications with 

 United States overseas sources of raw materials. * * * Everj^ important decision 

 we have made since the end of World War II is based on the fact that we can and 

 will maintain control of the seas * * * seapower and world power are synony- 

 mous. * * * The Navy maintains two carrier striking forces deployed, and two 

 in home water. * * * Our surface striking forces are capable of rendering surface 

 and air defense support to our fleets * * * our submarine striking force has a pri- 

 mary mission of ASW but is also capable of attacking enemy surface forces. * * * 

 Our' amphibious striking force is capable of providing sea lift and * * * beach 

 assault. * * * The Navy is particularly conscious of its ASW responsibilities. 

 Our ASW capabihty is the sum of our ability in many fields. It depends on how 

 well we are able to search for and detect submarines and finally to destroy them.^ 



In that regard, the Communist bloc is said to have 520 submarines 

 while the United States has 196 and the fleet of the free world totals 

 384. Onl}' 116 of the U.S. submarines are "in being"; the remainder 

 are mothballed.^ 



As an insight into the problem which the United States faces, 

 Garrison has noted: 



The significance of the Soviet drive for seapower is manifested in many ways 

 which are more subtle than the simple build-up of their submarine fleet * * *. 

 The extent of sea support for Communist imperialism is shown by the following 

 facts: 



a. Since World War II the Soviet Union has constructed more combatant 

 ships, with the exception of aircraft carriers, than any other nation in the 

 world. 



b. Sino-Soviet foreign trade is up 90% since 1953. 



c. The substantial merchant shipbuilding program in each of these coun- 

 tries was highlighted in November 1958 by the Chinese announcement that 

 they had constructed a freighter in the record time of fifty-eight days. 



d. The Soviet oceanographic research program far surpasses that of the 

 Free World. 



e. Activities of the Soviet fishing fleets in both the Atlantic and the 

 Pacific. Capabilities for other than routine fishing operations were verified 

 by the boarding, in January, of the Soviet trawler in the vicinity of the 

 Atlantic cable break. 



f. The Soviet submarine forces in the Atlantic have become more venture- 

 some and there are signs of more submarine activity in the Mediterranean. 



g. A Soviet prototype nuclear-powered icebreaker has been constructed.' 



The present situation has been further summarized by J. H. Probus: * 



1. International Communism has the avowed goal of a Moscow-dominated, 

 Communist controlled world. Communism wiU continue to use political, eco- 

 nomic, psychological, military and covert elements of Soviet bloc power to 

 achieve its aims. 



We in turn are dedicated to the task of resisting world communization. We 

 would like, ultimately, to see all people enjoy the freedoms we enjoy. 



2. The prospects of unrestrained nuclear warfare are so horrendous that we 

 must seek effective systems of deterrence. From a military and technological 

 viewpoint, we have no choice but to confront the Soviets with the fact of their 

 own assured destruction, should they initiate such a war. The Soviets are in a 

 similar situation. The resulting capability for mutual destruction, so long as it 

 is maintained under symmetrical psychological conditions, places severe limita- 

 tions upon the usefulness of the threat of unrestrained warfare as an instrument 

 of policy, except for acts of desperation. 



3. There is no foreseeable possibility of our "breaking" the nuclear stalemate 

 in the sense of obtaining absolute immunity to attack while preserving our 

 ability to attack the Soviets. The record clearly indicates, moreover, that it 



5 Senate Arme 1 Services Posture Hearing testimony by Admiral Arleigh Burke, Jan. 2fi, 1959. 



8 "'Jane's Fighting Ships," 19.59-60 Edition and testimony by Admiral Burke before Senate Committee 

 on Armed Services and Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Feb. 8, 1960. 



' "The Soviet Drive for Sea Power," by Capt. D. J. Garrison, USX, U.S. Xaval Inst. Proc, 85, pp. 67-71 

 (Oct. 1959). 



* "An Introductory Survey of Some of the Considerations that Influence the U.S. Xaval Shipbuilding 

 Program," op. cit., pp. 16-17. 



