14 OCKAN SCIENCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 



would not he greatly to our advantage to enjoy such immunity if in achieving i1 

 we denied to ourselves the possibility of conducting military actions on a lesser 

 scale. It is essential to discourage the Soviets from launching a preemi)tive 

 nuclear attack upon the United States. It is essential to seek conditions of 

 stability that will reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear exchange, and that will 

 enable us to preserve the existing nuclear stalemate — this while we simultaneously 

 develop and maintain the capability 1o conduct military actions on a lesser scale 

 for the purpose of giving our diplomacy greater freedom of action. And, of 

 course, our total military expenditures must not be of such magnitude as to be 

 self-defeating. 



The problem is the BALANCING of our requirements and programs. 



4. The .United States is a key member of a free world oceanic (confederation. 

 We and the other members of this confederation are increasingly dependent upon 

 the seas and upon surface shipping for our economic prosperity and our mutual 

 security. There is no foreseeable alternative to surface ships for meeting our 

 transoceanic transportation requirements — in peace or in war. We cannot now 

 deter attacks on our surface shipping solely by threatening the use of land based 

 weapons of mass destruction, nor could we before nuclear parity V)ecame a fact. 

 When our distant ships are actually subjected to attack, we cannot effectively 

 defend them from remote land bases. Our military capability vnist include 

 sea-based weapons systems, not only to protect our surface shipping, but our own 

 and friendly shores, and to allow us to project our military power abroad in the 

 degree required to support our national policies, objectives and agreements. 



Concerning the future, it is clear that every element of science and 

 technology will be exploited by the Soviets in use of the sea to serve 

 their national purpose. 



The prudent course in developing plans and programs to meet an uncertain 

 threat is to base these on unchanging or slowly changing principles and considera- 

 tions, to maintain as much freedom of action as pos.sible, to make rigid commit- 

 ments in advance only when they are desirable, to avoid commitments when 

 they are not desirable, and to seek wise balance of capabilities.' 



Before concluding this section on historical perspective, mention 

 should be made of research condticted by the United States on the sea 

 itself, a tradition not widely appreciated. To be sin-e, much of this 

 has had a romantic rather than scientific flavor. Nevertheless, it 

 was Benjamin Franklin who investigated the nature of the Gulf 

 Stream; 150 years ago, Nathaniel Bowditch of Salem, Mass., pub- 

 lished "New American Practical Navigator," which became an inter- 

 national reference. Expeditions were sponsored by the United States 

 in 1838-42, imder the command of Charles Wilkes, concerning the 

 South Pacific; hi 1852-54, Perry explored Japan and 1853-59 ex- 

 peditions studied the North Pacific. 



The Coast and Geodetic Survey was founded in 1807, the prede- 

 cessor of the Navy's Hydrographic Office in 1830. The systematic 

 charting of tides, currents, ocean temperatures, bottom depths, winds 

 and rainfall is credited to Matthew Fontaine Mam\y, who first pub- 

 lished "The Physical Geograpliy of the Sea" in 1855. 



This phenomenal work of Alatn'v's, however, was not subsequently 

 expanded. In then withering, American oceanography failed to ful- 

 fill its early promise. 



In 1927, a Connnittee on Oceanography formed under the National 

 Academy of Sciences, took note of the serious neglect of oceanic 

 research in the United States. Attention was effectively focused 

 on the needs, following which substantial private sums were forth- 

 coming for buildings and vessels, and generous endowments given 

 institutions on both coasts. The momentum of nongoverimiental 



' "An Introductory Survey of fionip of the Considrrations thut Infiuonci' the U.S. Naval Rhiphuilding 

 Program," op. cit., p. 19. 



