OCEAN SCIENCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 17 



B. THE RECENT SENSE OF URGENCY FOR OCEANIC RESEARCH 



/. Implications for Dejense 



Why now a sudden renaissance of interest in the sea? 



The most urgent and compelling reason generally cited is that of 

 self-preservation. In terms of military strategy, the continental 

 United States has been considered an island. Surrounded on essen- 

 tially three sides by water, and with friendly nations at our land 

 boundaries, the relationship of the United States to other nations, 

 hostile or friendly, has historically been that of an island power. ^^ 

 In freeing the United States from threats of invasion, the sea jirovided 

 a protective barrier that offered the most elementary and inexpensive 

 type of defense. 



The United States is itself committed to an underwater weapons 

 system as part of our cold-war policy of deterrence in which the 

 Polaris submarine represents a mobile, concealed base for the launch- 

 ing of intermediate range ballistic missiles. It is perhaps ironic that the 

 United States is itself vulnerable to the same strateg}'. 



Now, for the first time since 1812, strategists see a critical threat to 

 our national survival coming from the sea. Our coastline is long and 

 exposed; many of our major cities are directly on the coast, but 

 missiles launched far off shore in international waters can easily reach 

 St. Louis, Denver, Chicago, Albuquerque. The numerical strength 

 of the Soviet submarine fleet is common public knowledge — from 

 numerous sources, said to number between 400 and 500 relatively new 

 boats. Although by no means equal to Polaris subs in nuclear-tipped 

 missile capabilities, many, if not most, could surface-launch some 

 type of IRBM. None of these is believed yet to have the advantage 

 of nuclear power, with its potential for sustained submergence, or 

 enhanced submerged speed. But what may be a deficiency in high 

 speed and submerged performance can be more than offset by their 

 overwhelming numbers. Conceivabh^, by extremely quiet operation 

 that would permit their stealthy approach to our shores, they could 

 reach "station" possibly undetected, or even if detected, in sufficient 

 numbers to saturate our anti-submarine defenses. 



Does this capability give the aggressor an unbalanced advantage? 

 In the first instance, emanating from the element of surprise, the 

 aggressor always has some advantage. That fact is not a specific 

 characteristic of undersea warfare, but the oceans can effectively 

 hide activities within theu- depths. The presence of submarines is 

 almost exclusively detected by use of acoustical techniques — either a 

 passive system of listening for the vehicles' self-noise, or an active 

 system of steady pinging, listening for the echo. Neither system has 

 great range. Both are highly dependent on details of the ocean 

 medium. Thus underwater surveillance becomes a nightmare as 

 compared to the use of radar which can patrol great distances and 

 volumes of sky. 



The history of warfare is filled with examples of new and potent 

 weapons initially hatched with demonstrated characteristics of sur- 

 prise, of speed, of mobility, of invulnerability to counterattack. 

 Usually this technological superiority in warfare is only temporary — 

 at least if countermeasures are vigorously pursued. Where the need 



^ Yet, next to Mexico and Canada, Soviet Russia is our nearest neighbor— only 58 miles across the Berine 

 Strait from the 49th State, Alaska. 



