OCEAN SCIENCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 39 



Precedence has been established for such international cooperation 

 on disarmament as it relates to methods of detection of clandestine 

 nuclear tests. Agreement has not been reached, however, in part 

 because of unsettled scientific questions concerned with "decoupling" 

 of blasts which could be conducted in an underground cavity to defeat 

 detection. Progress in such disarmament leans heavily on science 

 and on agreement among scientists of different nations. The United 

 States depends on the nuclear-propelled missile-launching submarine 

 as an important element in our "mix" of deterrent weapons; but we 

 are vitally concerned with the Soviet submaruie threat, and the day 

 may come when both nations agree on mutual efforts to sustain a 

 sm'veillance system that would provide mutual guarantee against 

 stealthy attack. It is likely that any such system would depend on 

 the placement of location devices throughout the world, and the 

 effectiveness of these in providing an assured sm'veillance of the 

 ocean depends, to a great extent, upon further research on tech- 

 niques themselves as well as on knowledge of the sound transmission 

 and physical properties of the water in various geographical areas of 

 concern. 



Any such system would need a sensitivity sufficient to detect not 

 only submarines at current depths of operation but even at much 

 greater depth. Such a system might also have to detect bottom 

 crawlers that might even be more difficult to locate in the u-regular 

 terrain of certain parts of the ocean. While this country must pursue 

 a course of preparedness, the eventuality of international agreement 

 on such matters, perhaps through cooperative studv, was implied bv 

 NASCO. 



Yet another freciuently mentioned element of international oceanog- 

 raphy lies in leadership in cooperative scientific expeditions. In the 

 first instance, the resources of and in the high seas are the common 

 property of all nations so that exploration on a cooperative basis makes 

 more likely exploitation in the future free of national rivalry. Second, 

 an element of prestige attends leadership in such operations, both in 

 science and in world affahs. 



Statistics indicate that the number of scientists and engineers in 

 the I'^nited States is already exceeded by those in the U.S.S.R. and 

 that the disparity is growing. One primary consolation lies in the 

 intellectual resources of the free w^orld which, in the aggregate, out- 

 number those in the Sino-Soviet bloc. There are thus continuing and 

 even increasing reasons wh}^ the United States must depend upon and 

 foster contributions by scientists in friendly countries and it might be 

 expected that success in this activity w^ould be better assured by the 

 maintenance of the United States in a position of scientific eminence. 

 An example of a contrary situation lies in the events attending forma- 

 tion of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) , a sister organi- 

 zation to SCOR. Upon termination of the IGY, continuation of 

 international research in outer space was planned through COSPAR. 

 However, at its first meeting in London in 1958, the Soviet Union, 

 discovering that representatives nominated under the original charter 

 would come primarily from Western powers, insisted that it would 

 not participate unless the Conmiittee operations were revised so as 

 to reflect achievements by the Soviets in the space sciences. As a 

 consequence, the permanent organization provides for an Executive 

 ( ^ouncil which includes two Vice Presidents, one chosen from a slate 



