160 OCEAN SCIENCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 



the same time, that no portion of the program goes undeveloped 

 because of misunderstanding by all organizations that responsi- 

 bility was in another's hands ; 



(g) Cooperation in the development of needed manpower, 

 through fellowships, grants, etc., including information and pro- 

 cedures that would minimize "raiding"; 



(h) Coordinated use of advisory committees such as the Com- 

 mittee on Oceanography of the National Academy of Sciences, 

 and other groups so that separate panels would not be unneces- 

 sarily developed to advise narrow interests of particular Govern- 

 ment agencies that could as well or better be served through the 

 use of a smaller number of outside groups, jointly serving the 

 Government interests (such as was done in the case of the NASCO 

 study) . 

 The responsibility for coordination is presently placed by executive 

 action on the Interagency Committee on Oceanography, under the 

 Federal Council for Science and Technology. This organization 

 serves in an advisory capacity to the President and has no statutory 

 basis for its responsibilities. The presence of any such organization 

 in the political climate of the President's office thus suggests some 

 inlierent uncertainties about permanence and continuity. 



A far more basic question lies in the strengths and weaknesses of 

 any interdepartmental committee as a device for coordination. 

 Problems in this regard have been highlighted by a comprehensive 

 study of such committees by the Brookings Institution, relevant 

 sections of which have been quoted as a basis for understanding some 

 of the problems that may beset the ICO.^® 



The methods for bringing together points of view and for secui'ing decisions 

 on matters of interest to several agencies can in general be classified into two 

 main groups, within each of which various subdivisions can be distinguished. 

 One group of methods is essentially voluntary in character, and relies mainly 

 upon cooperation among the agencies concerned, however such cooperation is 

 organized. The other group of methods looks to the exercise of higher authority, 

 and relies mainly upon processes of organization and staff work that will prepare 

 matters for decision and bring them before an appropriate higher official, in 

 many cases the President. The voluntary methods range from the most informal 

 of relationships between agency personnel to the formal establishment of inter- 

 departmental committees whose terms of reference are imbedded in statute 

 law. The methods based on higher authority may similarly vary from the 

 gentlest kind of persuasive comment by members of a higher official's staff to 

 the issuance of a formal command in the form of an Executive order, backed 

 by the President's authority to remove from office if final disciplinary measures 

 become necessary. 



******* 



In some respects, the use of interdepartmental committees may have the effect 

 of qualifying executive responsibility. The traditional approach to United 

 States Government organization and procedure is to divide responsibilities among 

 executive departments, and to assign full authority to them. To the extent that 

 it is possible to make clear jurisdictional assignments, interdepartmental com- 

 mittees would perhaps not be necessary. But actual problems do not ordinarily 

 arise in separate and clearly divided categories. 



Experience seems to show that there are situations where a formally organ- 

 ized committee provides a useful framework for purposes of coordination. 

 Nevertheless, there appears to be a need for more care in the establishment of 

 committees, to limit their scope to matters on which they can be expected to be 

 productive, to insure better performance when they are necessary, and to prevent 



»» "The Adniinistration of Foreisn Affalfs and Overseas Operations," June 1951, Brookings Institution 

 (propare.fl for Bureau of Biidsot), pp. 327-360. 



