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best quality, which is the most efficient, which has the best produc- 

 tivity. 



And it's in that sense that we look at all of the programs in the 

 government, whether it's ATP or federal laboratories or univer- 

 sities. 



The ATP program grew ten-fold since that period of 1992. That's 

 a big increase. It may be good money spent well. But it needs an 

 evaluation. We don't know. 



So when we say we're skeptical, we would like to see what its 

 results are. And if they show well and if they compete well with 

 the other alternatives for spending federal money, perhaps they 

 should be supported. 



So we're raising questions that are appropriate for these times — 

 fiscal constraints, alternative ways of spending government money. 

 And that's the philosophy behind our ATP recommendation. 



Mr. Tanner. So your report — you did not do an analysis of the 

 ATP program to see if it was effective and see if it was 



Dr. Press. No. But we called for one. 



Mr. Tanner. Back to my first question. What would be — I've 

 read the report, but what would be, if you could expand on the pur- 

 pose for federally funding R&D in the macro sense — would you ex- 

 pand on — I know you had a statement purpose in the 1992 report, 

 a little less so in the 1995. 



What would be your characterization of the purpose? I think it's 

 something that we have to consider as a country. 



Dr. Press. You know, we built an extraordinary system, an infra- 

 structure for R&D, which is the envy of the world and which has 

 given us world scientific leadership. 



And the philosophy behind that growth I think still holds today. 



The basic purpose of R&D to help the government agencies per- 

 form their missions better. And those missions are the ones that 

 are important to the American people. 



What are they? Economic growth, national security, energy and 

 resources, competition, and perhaps the most visible one in Con- 

 gress is health. 



And in doing that, in setting up a research base in all of these 

 agencies, because of the aggregate effect, we also built the world's 

 strongest science and technological enterprise. And then we estab- 

 lished the National Science Foundation and gave it a general li- 

 cense just to support science and engineering for its own sake, un- 

 derstanding that there would be fall-out also of use to the Amer- 

 ican people. 



And that basis, I think, still is valid today. 



Mr. Tanner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 



Mr. Mahoney. I think the best way to add anything to Frank's 

 very clear analysis is it's been working. Not necessarily perfectly, 

 but it's been an extraordinary result if you go through the pieces. 

 And it wasn't always that way. Before the Second World War, we 

 were sort of follow-the-leaders. We were sort of the Japanese of 

 that time, taking the basic information out of Europe and exploit- 

 ing it in the U.S. 



We've gone to fundamental research here, which has been a tre- 

 mendous gain for us. 



Chairman Walker. Mr. Olver? 



