158 



My comments will focus primarily on recommendations 6-8 of the report. These 

 three — the heart of the report — deal with our nation's ability to maintain world 

 leadership in science and technology in an era of budget constraints. My perspective 

 derives from my role as the Director of Science and Technology Base Programs at 

 Los Alamos National Laboratory. There my responsibilities include assessing the 

 vigor and quality of the science and technology in our 15 technical divisions and de- 

 veloping investment strategies for our discretionary science and technology re- 

 sources and our external science education funds. 



There are three points that I wish to make: 



• While compelling missions are important for the DOE laboratories, their activities 



should not be unduly restricted, 



• The pluralistic system of science and technology funding sources and providers has 



served the nation well, and 



• We must encourage stronger networking among the elements of the nation's R&D 



enterprise. 



Recommendation 6 of the report argues that "R&D conducted in federal lab- 

 oratories should focus on the objectives of the sponsoring agency and not 

 expand beyond the assigned missions of the laboratories. The size and ac- 

 tivities of each laboratory should correspond to changes in mission re- 

 quirements." 



This section of the report refers to numerous earlier studies on the role of federal 

 laboratories in our nation's science and technology enterprise. One of the studies 

 cited is the 1995 review of the DOE multiprogram laboratories prepared by an ex- 

 ternal task force headed by Motorola's Executive Committee Chair Robert W. 

 Galvin. The discussion following recommendation 6 revisits many of the conclusions 

 reached by the Galvin Task Force. Since our laboratory was one of the subjects of 

 the Galvin Task Force on Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National 

 Laboratories, it is appropriate to look back on that period and our own struggle with 

 defining our mission at the end of the Cold War. 



The visits of the task force to the Laboratory, and indeed the entire Galvin Task 

 Force process, coupled with our own strategic planning process, helped focus our at- 

 tention on the need to clearly define and articulate our mission to our employees, 

 to our stakeholders and customers, and to the nation at large. The inquiries made 

 by the Galvin Task Force about our role within the DOE complex forced us to 

 confront this issue head on. As a result, we developed a renewed sense of purpose, 

 one that recognized our unique role in the world and one that reemphasized our 

 commitment to excellence in science and technology in service to the nation. 



The core mission that evolved is what we describe as reducing the global nuclear 

 danger. The five elements of that principal mission are: 



• nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship — keeping the weapons that the nation 



needs safe, secure, and reliable; 



• nuclear weapons stockpile support — providing capabilities ranging from dismantle- 



ment of weapons removed from the stockpile to remanufacturing of components 

 requiring replacement in the future; 



• nuclear materials management — ensuring the availability of tritium, and safe dis- 



position of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium; 



• effective nonproliferation and counterproliferation technologies — keeping nuclear 



weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons knowledge out of the wrong 

 hands; and 



• environmental stewardship — cleaning up the legacy of fifty years of nuclear weap- 



ons development and production. 



Reducing the global nuclear danger is a very compelling national mission. These 

 clearly are problems where the government must lead. 



This mission is supported by eight core competencies: nuclear science, plasmas, 

 and beams; nuclear and advanced materials; nuclear weapons science and tech- 

 nology; analysis and assessment; complex experimentation and measurements; the- 

 ory, modeling, and high-performance computing; bioscience and biotechnology; and 

 earth and environmental systems. These core competencies and the underlying ca- 

 pabilities are crucial to our mission. 



Los Alamos' core competencies in turn provide the basis for our selective partici- 

 pation in civilian national missions, conventional defense research and development, 

 and industrial partnerships. Work in these areas serves other important national 

 needs while providing critical support to our core mission by strengthening and 

 maintaining our core competencies. Thus "reducing the global nuclear danger" is an 

 effective shorthand for our mission, but it requires an understanding of the com- 

 petencies required to fulfill that mission and how they will be supported. 



