182 



in- and through-Delta facilities) as needed "to minimize possible adverse impacts upon [CVP] water 

 contractors." Shifts all costs associated with the provision of baseline water supplies from CVP 

 beneficiaries (as partial mitigation for CVP impacts) to federal taxpayers. 



Comments: Allows for potentially-unlimited reductions in "firm" refuge deliveries through inappropriate 

 application of agricultural best management practices, with any "conserved" water accruing to the benefit 

 of other CVP contractors (compare to Water Conservation provisions, below.) Requires costly and 

 unrealistic taxpayer-funded infrastructure capacity investments. Requires water supply reductions for any 

 reason, and at any time, that CVP irrigation supplies are also reduced. 



RESTORATION FUND Reduces Restoration Fund receipts by an estimated $5-30 million per year, 

 increasing with time (see the above conmients on contract renewals, water transfers, water pricing, and 

 Friant contributions). Prohibits collection of Restoration Fund surcharges for the storage or conveyance 

 of non-project water (e.g., "surplus" flood flows or Warren Act water). Eliminates assured Restoration 

 Fund surcharge income in FY98 and beyond. Retains antiquated "ability to pay" limitations on 

 Restoration Fund collections while removing all consideration of benefits provided through CVPIA- 

 authorized water marketing, assured renewals, etc. 



Depletes available balances by requiring payments to be made to the State of California for its San Joaquin 

 River Management Program activities. Eliminates the required apportioiunent of available funds into 

 "habitat" (2/3) and "structural" (1/3) components. Adds a requirement that supplemental water may only 

 be acquired "by purchase" even if other alternatives can be used to acquire water voluntarily. 



Comments: Reduced collections impose new but hidden costs on CVP power customers, changes the 

 balance of collections between various project components and functions, and may require budgetary 

 offsets of $30 million/year or more. The exclusion of "surplus" or Warren Act water ignores the fact that 

 the storage and conveyance of non-Project water can and often does result in the same environmental 

 impacts as the storage and conveyance of Project water. Modified "ability to pay" provisions continue 

 to raise serious questions in light of the contractors' concurrent efforts and apparent "ability to buy" the 

 Project itself. 



Required payments to the State raise serious concerns given tlie State's failure to meet its commitments 

 to provide cost share funding for CVPlA-authorized projects and programs. Elimination of the Fund's 

 apportionment provisions will remove any assurance that Restoration Fund balances will be available when 

 and in the amounts needed for supplemental water acquisitions (a key feature of the CVPIA as enacted). 

 Limiting supplemental acquisitions to purchased water will also eliminate acquisitions through other 

 voluntary methods (e.g., incentive-based pricing programs) and as part of the public's rightful share of 

 water "developed" through, e.g., the $80 million Shasta Temperature Control Device. 



YIELD INCREASE Gives new priority to completion of a study to replace the CVP yield (or water) 

 dedicated (or reserved) for fish and wildlife purposes by the CVPIA in order to satisfy, "without 

 limitation," the Secretary's contractual obligations. Further burdens the CVP with a statutory requirement 

 to provide an alternative water supply for the Stockton East and Central San Joaquin Water Districts "at 

 no impact to other CVP contractors" and with 75 percent of costs to be borne by federal taxpayers. 



Comments: The above yield-increase study is nearly complete, with a draft for public review already 

 released. (Missing from these amendments is any commitment on the part of Project beneficiaries to pay 

 for any such increase.) See also tlie above comments on "New Contracts." 



A-5 



