the sharing of revenues derived from the production of mineral 

 resources beyond 200 miles is the only way to achieve widespread 

 agreement. 



In Committee HI, progress has been made on pollution questions. The 

 issues of monitoring, environmental assessment, land-based pollution, 

 ocean dumping, and Continental Shelf pollution are very near resolu- 

 tion. The key outstanding issue concerns vessel source pollution, and a 

 balance is being sought between the protection of the marine environ- 

 ment and the requirements of navigation. 



In the other subject area under the cognizance of Committee III — 

 marine scientific research — there has not been as much progress. The 

 most difficult issue involves reaching agreement upon a regime for 

 marine scientific research within the economic zone that will balance 

 the freedom to conduct scientific research against the interests of coastal 

 states, as perceived primarily by the less developed coastal states. The 

 Single Negotiating Text provides that any research project related to the 

 living and nonliving resources of the economic zone and the Continental 

 Shelf shall be conducted only with the explicit consent of the coastal 

 state. Scientific research of a fundamental nature (i.e., not related to the 

 living and nonliving resources of the economic zone and the Continental 

 Shelf) would not require the explicit consent of the coastal state, but 

 could instead be conducted upon notification to the coastal state and 

 compliance with internationally agreed upon conditions. 



In Committee I, the issues concerning the development of deep- 

 seabed minerals remain contentious. During the first half of the Geneva 

 session, the United States agreed to consider including basic conditions 

 of exploitation in the treaty as opposed to detailed regulatory provisions. 

 The United States also agreed to consider a system of joint ventures, 

 with the possibility of profit sharing with the International Seabed 

 Resource Authority (ISRA), as the single method of exploitation and 

 proposed a reservation of areas system. Under the latter approach, an ap- 

 plicant for a joint venture would submit two mine sites, one of which 

 ISRA would designate a reserved areas. In the reserved area, ISRA could 

 negotiate with applicants for mining ventures on behalf of ISRA. 



At midsession, the chairman of the Committee I working group in- 

 troduced a personal draft text that focused primarily on a contractual 

 joint venture system that included a reservation of areas for states as 

 well as a reservation of areas for direct exploitation by ISRA. This 

 elaboration of a parallel system (an approach in which ISRA directly ex- 

 ploits at the same time as states and their nationals exploit under a sepa- 

 rate system) was considered intensively by the Group of 77 (actually a 

 group of over 100 less developed countries) and, eventually, was re- 

 jected for ideological reasons. 



15 



