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legitimate needs for the continued protection through 

 classification of some dimensions of the Navy's ocean data. It 

 is essential, though, to be clear about what can and cannot be 

 done, if classification policies remain as they stand today. A 

 significant change in these policies may be necessary, if we are 

 to realize the full scientific promise across the breadth of ocean 

 and Earth sciences foreseen here. 



The Executive Order (EO) that provides the basic legal authority 

 for national security classification within the defense and 

 intelligence communities has recently been extensively 

 revised, EO 12958 of April 20, 1995, signed by President 

 Clinton, with an effective date of October 14, 1 995, replaces its 

 predecessor EO 12356. While this new EO introduces 

 significant changes to many dimensions of security 

 classification, for present purposes it is only important to note 

 that it specirically authorizes balancing of the public 

 interest in order to declassify information that continues 

 to meet the standards for classification. It also requires 

 both automatic declassification of information at least 25 

 years old (with very narrowly drawn exceptions) and calls for 

 both systematic and mandatory declassification reviews. 



In addition, we understand that there are efforts in progress 

 within the DoD concerning the declassification of several of the 

 databases examined by this study. At a minimum these include 



• An effort directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

 (OSD) to develop a response to the recommendations made 

 by the ETF, including naval dimensions that partially overlap 

 with those of the present study; 



• Discussions within the OSD and the Services concerning the 

 advisabilityofdeclassifyingGeosat data and making available 

 precision Global Positioning System (GPS) capabilities; 



• Efforts by the Oceanographer of the Navy and the Commander, 

 Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command to 

 declassify selected data such as high-resolution bathymetry ; 



• New classification guidelines have been developed that may 

 result in declassifying some of the submarine acoustic ice 

 keel draft data to be discussed here. 



The dynamics created by these and other efforts, with the heated 

 debates that the subject of declassification always provokes, 

 cannot be resolved, or even understood, in a brief study such as 

 this (nor would it be appropriate for us to attempt this). We 

 have, therefore, chosen to set aside consideration of all of these 

 declassification efforts and concentrate solely on identifying 

 the scientific utility of the various data. If one or more 

 declassification efforts result in releaseof any data set identified 

 here, it will constitute a significant step forward toward achieving 

 greater public benefit from previous investments and is to be 

 applauded. 



We believe that, with one exception, there has been no post- 

 cold-war security classification assessment that has taken into 

 account scientific payoff to the national interest on the benefit 

 side of the ledger. The single exception was the Classification 

 Review Task Force (CRTF) undertaken by the DCI and the 

 Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) regarding the classification 

 policies of space-based imagery. The CRTF built its case for 

 the "benefits of declassification' on the ETF study. It is our 

 hope that an assessment comparable to the CRTF will be 

 undertaken of the Navy's oceanography databases, and that the 

 open-mindedness of that assessment will be taken as a model. 



We recognize that, even with a careful weighing of national 

 security risks on the one hand, and public benefits on the other, 

 it may prove to be imprudent to declassify some entire data sets. 

 In seeking a compromise position then, it may be possible to 

 declassify geographic subsets of the data (e.g. , a set of predefined 

 ■■postage stamps") or some form of decimated or smoothed 

 data. A second alternative to a perhaps unattainable, complete 

 declassification of entire data sets would be the development of 

 a set of specific derived products. If this were done with a view 

 toward both national security .sensitivities and scientific utility, 

 these derived products might balance the ■■equities" in a mutually 

 agreeable fashion. 



It is our view that the Navy should conduct a systematic high- 

 level declassification review of the environmental data 

 considered here. Moreover, this review should include some 

 form of MEDEA involvement. We assume that this would be 

 in an advisory capacity only and would serve to ensure that the 

 necessary compromises proceed so as to elicit the most 

 scientifically useful data. 



