168 



of the applicable regulations... but it is more reasonable 

 to presume that Congress intended to require that hunters 

 shall investigate at their peril conditions surrounding the 

 fields in which they seek their quarry. Untied States v. 

 Reese, 27 F.Supp. 833, 835 (W.D.Tenn 1939); see also. 

 United States v. Schultze, 28 F.Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky 1939). 



Based upon this single point of reasoning, a vast inverted pyramid of law has developed 

 following this case regardless of various factual patterns or, indeed, the innocence, in fact, of the 

 defendants involved^. Even though the innocense may be established by the evidence and 

 recognized by the court that a defendant did not know, or could not have reasonably known, the 

 alleged bait was present, guilt will attach. For example, the court in United States v. Catlett, 1^1 

 F.2d 1 102 (6th Cir. 1984) recognized that the defendants did not intend to hunt over bait and had 

 not placed any bait in the gunning area. The court, however, did not hesitate to "reluctantly " 

 affirm a conviction of the "unfortunate" AtknAaxAs^ (Emphasis added) Id. at 1103. 



There have been a few cases that have departed from the strict liability doctrine. In Allen 

 V. Merovka, 382 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967) certain private land owners who were surrounded on 

 three sides by a state waterfowl refuge where a bird feeding program was undertaken, brought an 

 action to stop the state from prohibiting hunting on their land. They were successful in obtaining 

 an order restraining state officials from prohibiting hunting on their land. Allen v. McClellan, 75 

 N.M. 400, 405 P. 2d 405 (1965). Thereafter, the federal officials sought to post the land as 

 "baited" since the adjoining refuge area had com crop that had been knocked down to feed 

 migrating waterfowl. The landowners went to federal court to restrain the federal officials from 



^See. e.g.. United Stales v. Orme, 51 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1995) affd. without a pub. opin. United States v. Diez. 851 

 F.Supp. 708 (D.Md.. 1993); United States v. Van Fossan, 889 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Engler, 

 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.den., 481 U.S. 1019 0987); United States v. Green, 571 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1977); 

 United States V. W'oo^, 437 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1971); Rogersv. United States, 2,61 ? .lA 998 (8th Cir. 1966), 

 cert.den.. 386 U.S. 943 (1967); United States v. Ardoin, 431 F.Supp. 234 (W.D.La. 1977). 



■'it must be noted that a jury trial is not available to the defendants in these cases since the offense is statutorily 

 considered a "petty offense". 18 USC §1(3). The Supreme Court has held that a jury is only required when the 

 offense is considered to invoke "serious" consequences. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See, United 

 States V. Ireland 493 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1973). 



