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concept if two or more ecologically interde- 

 pendent species are being exploited. Of neces- 

 sity, the biological objective tlien must be 

 accompanied by an economic objective — to 

 maintain the maximum sustainable comiwsite 

 yield producing the greatest economic return. 



Furthermore, fisheries are common prop- 

 erty in that no fisherman has exclusive access 

 nor may he keep others from sharing in their 

 exploitation. Fishing situations in which total 

 revenues exceed total costs induce additional 

 fishermen to enter the fishery and encourage 

 additional effort by those already in the fish- 

 ery. As a result, no individual fishing unit has 

 the incentive to restrict fishing effort to that 

 which will maximize economic return over 

 the long term. The more competitive the 

 fishery, the more destructive the race to catch 

 fish before others can take them. The result 

 is an industry with excess capacity relative to 

 what is required to catch the maximum sus- 

 tainable yield. This situation restricts fisher- 

 men and vessel owners to low, unstable in- 

 comes and may result in total jDroduction less 

 than that obtainable with less investment and 

 effort. 



It is not only possible but also normal for 

 such excess capacity to develop quickly, par- 

 ticularly in a new fishery, and to persist over 

 long periods of time because of the tradi- 

 tional immobility of labor in the fisheries 

 and the related ability to maintain capital 

 equipment at little or no real cost. 



The Commission recommends that fish- 

 eries management have as a major objec- 

 tive production of the largest net economic 

 return consistent with the biological 

 capabilities of the exploited stocks. 



More fish can be taken by pushing effort 

 beyond the point at which marginal reve- 

 nues will equal marginal costs. But because 

 costs will then increase more than revenues, 



the additional fish will not be worth the ad- 

 ditional effort required to produce them. 



Many measures employed in fisheries man- 

 agement, including those called for in inter- 

 national fisheries agreements — for example, 

 limitations upon the areas in which and the 

 time when fishing may be conducted, the 

 prohibition of specific types of fishing gear, 

 and overall catch limits — achieve their con- 

 servation objectives by increasing the costs 

 of operation and thereby, hopefully, decreas- 

 ing the incentive to fish. To the extent that 

 these measures attain their conservation ob- 

 jectives without raising production costs, 

 they simply encourage more unnecessary 

 fishing effort. 



Conservation regulations affecting the 

 minimum age and size of the fish that may 

 be caught can be sound from an economic as 

 well as conservation point of view because 

 they tend to reduce the costs of operations. 

 But if successful, they increase the profitabil- 

 ity of the fishery and again encourage an in- 

 tensification of the fishing effort that threat- 

 ens to dissipate the potential improvement in 

 net economic yield. 



Fisheries management usually reacts to 

 greater fishing effort by shortening the fish- 

 ing season. So, for example, the conservation 

 program in the Puget Sound salmon fishery 

 succeeded in increasing physical yields, but 

 this success has produced such an influx of 

 boats and gear that fishing is allowed only 2 

 or 3 days per week. Probably no more than 

 half the gear now in use could harvest the 

 catch at a saving of perhaps 40 per cent of 

 the gross value of the landings. 



Similarly, the Pacific Halibut Commission 

 restored the halibut yield and raised the total 

 catch limit by about 25 per cent over a period 

 of 20 years. This induced a 300 per cent in- 

 crease in the number of participating vessels. 

 Consequently, the original 9-month season 



