105 



in importance. Moreover, the fishery conven- 

 tions also affect U.S. imports from the areas 

 covered by tiie conventions, a portion of 

 whicii may be accounted for by U.S. com- 

 panies operating under foreign flags. 



Evaluation of Existing Framework and 

 Recommendations 



The Commission has considered and re- 

 jected the following principal alternatives to 

 the existing framework which have been pi-o- 

 posed to govern exploitation of the living re- 

 sources of the high seas : 



• To give each coastal nation permanent 

 exclusive access to the living resources of 

 the waters superjacent to its continental 

 shelf. 



• To give the United Nations, in the name 

 of the international community, title to 

 the living resources of the high seas be- 

 yond the 12-mile fisheries limit so that it 

 may either operate the high seas fisheries 

 itself or auction to the highest bidders ex- 

 clusive rights to exploit specified stocks 

 of fish or specified areas of the high seas. 

 These alternatives are discussed in the Re- 

 port of the Commission's International 

 Panel. 



The Commission concludes that U.S. ob- 

 jectives regarding the living resources of the 

 high seas can best be attained by improving 

 and extending existing international ar- 

 rangements, in the development of which the 

 United States has participated for more tiian 

 .-)() yea re. 



National Catch Quotas 

 for the North Atlantic Cod 

 and Haddock Fisheries 



The dominant objective of practically all 

 the fishery conxentions is to maintain the 

 maxinnini sustainable yield of the fish stxx'ks 

 under tlieir governance. We liave previously 



stressed the inadvisability of regarding this 

 biological result as the only aim of interna- 

 tional fisheries management and urged that, 

 at the least, such management should not 

 make it impossible for fishing nations to con- 

 duct profitable operations. 



The Commission concludes that fixing na- 

 tional catch quotas is a promising way to 

 make it possible for participating nations to 

 improve the pi'ofitability of their operations 

 in certain important fishing areas of the 

 world. We do not suggest that a national 

 catch quota system should be instituted im- 

 mediately in every high seas fishery. It should 

 be attempted first where it is most likely to 

 succeed, and its effects should be assessed be- 

 fore it is more widely used. 



The cod and haddock fisheries of the North- 

 west Atlantic are ripe for such an attempt. 

 Fourteen nations, including the United 

 States, adhere to the International Conven- 

 tion for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

 (ICNAF). Moreover, many fishing fleets in 

 the ICNAF area also operate in the area gov- 

 erned by the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries 

 Convention (NEAFC),to which 13 nations, 

 but not the United States, belong. Nine coun- 

 tries are parties to both conventions. Conse- 

 quently, adoption of national catch quotas 

 for the ICNAF area alone could increase fish- 

 ing pressure upon the NEAFC area, which 

 also faces a grave situation, and vice versa, 

 nullifying any potential economic gain from 

 national catch (piotas for fleets operating in 

 both areas. For this reason, the proposed 

 quota system must embrace the cod and had- 

 dock fisheries of the entire North Atlantic. 



The Commission recommends that the 

 United States seek agreement in ICNAF 

 to collaborate with NEAFC in fixing a 

 single annual overall catch limit for the 

 cod and haddock fisheries of the North 

 Atlantic, including the whole ICNAF area 



