lO^ 



lioavy catrlu's of liadilock l)y the Soviet fish- 

 iiii;- licet ami the limited mobility of the T'.S. 

 trawler fleet, the I'liited States has siiiiered 

 declining catches. It is estimated that tlie 

 maximum sustainable catch of Georges Bank 

 haddock can be taken with a sharply reduced 

 fishing eli'ort which, in the long run, would 

 increase the average catch per unit of effort 

 by about TiO per cent over the 1968-64 level. 



Yet a study by the Organization for 

 Kconomic Cooperation and Development 

 ( OECD) indicates tjiat, if notjiing is done to 

 reduce it, fishing etfort in the North Atlantic 

 may further increase by as much as 15 to 30 

 per cent by 1970. This probably will result 

 in a decrease in the total catcli as well as re- 

 duction in the catch per unit of effort. 



ICXAF has discussed the idea of national 

 catch quotas since 1965. The idea was en- 

 dorsed and elaborated in 1967 by an ICNAF 

 Working (iroup on Joint Biological and Eco- 

 nomic Assessment of Conservation Actions. 

 .V standing Committee on Regulatory Meas- 

 ures continues to examine its economic and 

 administrative aspects. At ICXAF's 196.S 

 meeting, the United States proposed the es- 

 tablishment of national catch ([uotas as an 

 appropriate solution of the <'ritical problems 

 facing the North Atlantic fisheries. ICNAF 

 is still studying the matter. 



The ICNAF Working Group concluded 

 in 1967 that a system of national catch quotas 

 was feasible and enforceable. The Working 

 Group I'ecognized fully that greater bene- 

 fits could be obtained if each separable cod 

 and haddock population could be managed 

 as an independent unit. It could not, how- 

 ever, devise any enforceable procedures of 

 this type, since there is no way of identifying 

 the area of capture with sufficient accuracy. 



The fixing of national catch quotas does 

 not guarantee that each nation participat- 

 ing in the fisheries will actually realize the 

 economic gains made possible by the quota 



system. If a nation does nf)t restrict its fish- 

 ing units to the mininuun number required 

 to take its quota over a i)rolonged period of 

 time and if each of these units is not of 

 maxinumi efficiency, it will dissipate the 

 jjofential gains. For example, the ICNAF 

 Working Group's study of U.S. operations 

 on Georges I^ank haddock revealed that if 

 the number of fishing days per vessel were 

 reduced by 30 per cent, leaving michanged 

 the number of vessels and manpower devoted 

 to the fishery, only very small long-term 

 benefits would be achieved, by catch quotas 

 and short-term losses would be inflicted on 

 both vessel owner and crew. But if the input 

 of capital and labor is curtailed to allow full 

 utilization of the remaining fishing capacity, 

 an immediate and substantial improvement 

 of the economic situation is certain, and, in 

 the long run, the industry would liecome 

 highly profitable. 



To assure that each nation rationalizes its 

 fishing etfort, it has been proposed that 

 ICNAF directly allocate to each par- 

 ticipating nation the maximum amount of 

 fishing effort that it may devote to the fish- 

 eries in (juestion, making certain that the 

 total amount of fishing etfort allocated will 

 maximize the net economic return from these 

 fisheries. 



There are both practical and policy ob- 

 jections to this alternative. As a practical 

 matter, it is presently impossible to devise a 

 workable program to restrict fishing effort 

 directly. Total fishing effort is a function of 

 many factors — the number of vessels em- 

 ployed; their size, power, and type of gear; 

 the number of hours spent in fishing and 

 the particular season and grounds fished. 

 To date, there is no internationally accepted 

 unit of fishing effort which combines all these 

 factors. Even if there were, it would be 

 virtually impossible to enforce direct limits 

 on the amount of fishing, particularly the 



