108 



number of liours fished by vessels far from 

 liome. 



Furthermore, the variations among coun- 

 tries of fishing methods and economic and 

 social conditions produce different cost 

 structures and market preferences which 

 make it difficult to determine objectively at 

 what level of total fishing effort the maxi- 

 nuun net economic return would be obtained. 



Even if these difficulties could te sur- 

 mounted, this alternative would be undesir- 

 able, because it would force every nation 

 participating in the fisheries to adopt maxi- 

 mization of net economic return as its domes- 

 tic policy. By contrast, the recommended na- 

 tional catch quota system will enable each 

 nation to use its quota in the manner it 

 decides is best suited to its internal condi- 

 tions. It may seek : 



• To maximize its net income from the 

 fisheries 



• To pre\'ent serious unemployment in fish- 

 ing communities witli no viable alternative 



• To provide fisli at the lowest possible price 

 to consumers 



• To improve its balance of payments 



• To pursue two or more of these aims in 

 \arying degrees. 



The Commission recommends that the 

 United States take advantage of the op- 

 portunity presented by a quota system to 

 rationalize its fishing effort in the North 

 Atlantic. 



We have previously discussed the problem 

 of rationalizing I^.S. fishing efforts gener- 

 ally, and this discussion also is applicable to 

 U.S. participation in the North Atlantic cod 

 and haddock fisheries. 



Early Consideration of National Catch 

 Quotas for High Sea Fisheries of the 

 North Pacific 



The problems confronting the nations par- 

 ticipating in the North Atlantic cod and 

 haddock fisheries are not unique. The situa- 

 tion in the North Pacific is rapidly approach- 

 ing that of the North Atlantic. 



The Commission recommends that early 

 consideration be given to instituting na- 

 tional catch quotas for the high seas 

 fisheries of the North Pacific. 



Canada, Japan, and the United States ad- 

 here to the International Convention on the 

 High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific 

 (INPFC). The recommended quota system 

 would help to resolve the impasse over the 

 abstention doctrine that confronts INPFC. 



INPFC is the only fishery convention in 

 which member nations agree to abstain from 

 fishing for specified stocks of fish (salmon, 

 halibut, and herring) in specified areas of the 

 high seas. The abstention principle has been 

 strongly advocated by the United States and 

 justified on the ground that the nation 

 through whose investment a high seas fish- 

 ery has been developed, and through whose 

 regulatory efforts (and consequent restraints 

 upon its fishermen) it is being conserved, 

 should have priority in its exploitation and, 

 if the stocks are being fully utilized, even 

 the right to exclude other nations which made 

 no similar contributions to the fishery. In 

 the case of Pacific salmon, for example, the 

 United States maintains that it has restrained 

 its own fishermen for more than 50 years 

 and spent hundreds of millions of dollars 

 for pollution control, fish ladders, fish hatch- 

 eries, artificial propagation, and research to 

 protect and enhance the salmon population. 



The abstention doctrine has been at- 

 tacked on many grounds. While it is ac- 



