lis 



(2) 11 nonparticipating coastal nation, or 

 (;5) under sonio circunistances, a noufoastal, 

 nonparticipatintj nation. If agreement is not 

 reached, the Convention autliorizes any such 

 nation to in\okc' the disjiute settlement ma- 

 chinery it e-stablishcs. Meanwhile, the coastal 

 nation to involve the dispute settlement ma- 

 nondiscriniinatory conservation measures 

 which jjovern foreign fishermen, stibject to 

 the same dispute settlement machinery. De- 

 cisions of the special connnission created to 

 settle the disputes are bindinjj on tlie nations 

 concerned. 



The Convention provides the means to bol- 

 ster all existing fishery conventions. Its proce- 

 dures could be invoked to prevent depletion 

 of certain fish stocks until a convention 

 specifically dealing witli these stocks is 

 adopted. They also could be employed if a na- 

 tion belonging to an existing convention re- 

 fuses to accept a commission recommendation 

 or if a nation whicli is not a member enters 

 the convention area and disregards the exist- 

 ing conservation regulations. The coastal na- 

 tion could then act unilat.erally and probably 

 could take effective action to enforce its con- 

 servation regulations. 



Unfortunately, however, it is doubtfid that 

 the Convention on Fishing and Conservation 

 of the Living Kesources of the High Seas has 

 been accepted by a sufficient number of the 

 important fishing nations of the world to 

 have become part of international law. The 

 combined catches of the countries adhering to 

 the Convention amounted to only 14 per cent 

 of the world catch in 1965, and the United 

 States, the United Kingdom, and South 

 Africa, the only major fishing nations in this 

 group, accounted for more than two-thirds 

 of this 14 per cent. 



It is difficult to say, therefore, that a coastal 

 nation would be clearly justified to invoke the 

 Convention as the source of its authority to 

 impose its conservation measures upon any 



nation which is not a, party to the Convention. 

 The refusal of any important fishing nation 

 to cooperate in a multinational conservation 

 effort, although it jjarticipates in the fisliery 

 affected by that effort, remains a threat to the 

 conservation and economic objectives of in- 

 ternational fisheries management. 



The Commission recommends that re- 

 newed diplomatic efforts be made to per- 

 suade all important fishing nations of the 

 world to adhere to the Convention on 

 Fishing and Conservation of the Living 

 Resources of the High Seas. 



For similar reasons, it is important that 

 all nations interested in the fislieries of a par- 

 ticular area become parties to the applicable 

 convention. 



Administrative Organization and Budget 



The fisheries commissions to which the 

 Ignited States belongs will spend ajjj^roxi- 

 mately $3,313,(}()0 in the Fiscal Year 1969. 

 The United States will contribute $2,064,000 

 of this total, of which $1,029,400 will go to 

 the work of the Great Lakes Fisheries Com- 

 mission. In addition, the United States will 

 spend about $2,700,000 in Fiscal 1969 on re- 

 search of interest to commissions which do 

 not have their own scientific staffs. 



The Commission estimates that the total 

 amount spent in Fiscal 1969 on fisheries by 

 all international organizations, including 

 those in the United Nations family and the 

 fisheries commissions to which the United 

 States is not a party, will equal no more than 

 a small fraction of 1 per cent of the $10 bil- 

 lion which is the estimated value of the total 

 catch from the world's fisheries in 1968. 



The small budgets with which some of the 

 fisheries commissions operate reflect the de- 

 liberate choice of their member nations to 

 rely on their own fisheries research tigencies 

 and not to supply the commissions with full- 



