lU 



time scientific, technical, and economic staffs 

 to accomplisli tlieir obje<?tives. Wliilc impres- 

 sive scientific worlv lias been accomplished in 

 this manner, there is always the dan^jer that 

 scientific opinion may tend to serve, or be 

 suspected of serving-, national interests on 

 issues of great moment. An international staff' 

 may serve to enhance the acceptability of 

 commission recommendations. 



Equally serious, many nations belonging 

 to fisheries conventions or to the regional 

 fisheries councils of the T".X. Food and Agri- 

 culture Organization lack tlie necessary 

 scientific personnel or tlie resources to em- 

 ploy them. They are unable, therefore, to 

 do the research required to establish the 

 scientific basis for the conservation work of 

 tlie fisjieries commission or council in ques- 

 tion. Yet the commission or council may have 

 no staff' of its own to do the work. 



The Commission recommends that inter- 

 national fisheries commissions, particu- 

 larly in those areas where some member 

 nations lack the personnel or the re- 

 sources to employ them, should be ade- 

 quately financed by the member nations 

 so that they can employ full-time, compe- 

 tent staffs to provide the scientific, techni- 

 cal, and economic data and analyses 

 needed to accomplish the objectives of the 

 conventions. 



Enforcement Most fisheries conventions 

 leave it to eucli member nation to enforce the 

 provisions of the convention and the com- 

 mission regulations implementing them 

 against its own nationals and vessels. Some 

 go furtlier and autiiorize officials of any 

 member nation to board, searcli, and seize the 

 vessel of an\- otlier member nation suspected 

 of a violation, but the seized vessel and ar- 

 rested crew must be turned over for trial and 



punishment to the nation to which they 

 belong. 



It is difficult to say whether these weak 

 provisions have created serious enforcement 

 jiroblems. Once the nations adhei'ing to a 

 fisjieries convention agree to adopt conser- 

 \ation measures of importance, it is to the 

 advantage of each to comply. Nevertheless, 

 stronger enforcement provisions might re- 

 duce mutual suspicions of noncompliance 

 and nonenforcement which encourage fisher- 

 men of all nations to disregard conservation 

 regulations whenever they think they can 

 do so with impunity. Stronger provisions 

 also will be required to enforce the recom- 

 mended quota system. 



The Commission recommends that en- 

 forcement of the provisions of interna- 

 tional fisheries conventions and imple- 

 mentation of regulations of the fisheries 

 commissions be strengthened. 



Dispute Settlement The 1958 Geneva Con- 

 \entions on tlie Law of the Sea were accom- 

 panied liy an Optional Protocol authorizing 

 any ratifying nation to bring before the In- 

 ternational Court of Justice any dispute 

 involving it and another nation also adhering 

 to the Protocol, if the dispute arises out of the 

 intei'pretation or application of any provi- 

 sion of any of the Conventions. The Optiona;l 

 Pi-otocol excepts disputes subject to the 

 arbitration machinery created by the Conven- 

 tion on Fishing and Conservation of the Liv- 

 ing Resources of tlie High Seas. Tlie United 

 States has signed but lias not ratified the 

 Optional Protocol. 



The Commission recommends that the 

 United States ratify the Optional Protocol 

 Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 

 Disputes and support compulsory arbitra- 



