GENERAL FARM PROGRAM 525 



and women of sucli f ducation and resourcefniness that industry looks 

 to them hugely in tlie selection of nnmy if not most of its top execu- 

 tives. There is practically no disagreement over the necessity" of 

 finding Avays to maintain a stable rural income if we are to avoid 

 another disastrous collapse. The question is. How is it to be done? 



In considering the answer to this question, we must recognize 

 that this is not a farm problem alone. It is part of a tremendous 

 economic problem affecting eA'ery phase of our national life and cannot 

 be considered sol eh' from the standpoint of agriculture. We are 

 too much inclined to think in terms of returning to normal condi- 

 tions and to measui'e those conditions bj' prewar standards. We 

 fail to recognize that we are living in an abnormal time; in a period 

 of transition between war and stable peace; and that a stable peace 

 nuist be measured by different standards from those to which we are 

 accustomed. 



During the war we sent more than 10.000,000 of our young men into 

 the armed services during their most productive j'ears, and yet at our 

 maximum, we increased farm production by a third, and industrial 

 production possibly even more. Despite this enormous production 

 increase we developed extensive shortages both at home and through- 

 out the world. With the end of hostilities Ave ha^-e been engaged in 

 meeting our normal demands, while at the same time catching up on 

 this unprecedented backlog of demand, and sending 4 or 5 billion 

 tlollars worth of goods to Europe and other war-torn countries. In 

 other words, Avith the aid of modern equipment and methods Ave have 

 learned to produce at a tremendously expanded rate which is enabling 

 us to catch up with the backlog A^ery rapidly Avith a lot of productive 

 capacity to spare. Very soon we will also reach the end of European 

 aid. The real question America faces is Avhat will we then do Avith the 

 unprecedented production, both agricultural and industrial pro- 

 duction. 



We face one of two alternatiA^es. Either we Avill reduce our produc- 

 tion to meet our demand, or Ave must find Avays to increase our con- 

 sumption to absorb the supply. AVe are referring, of course, both to 

 farm and industrial production but Avith emphasis on the latter. If 

 Ave are to i-educe production to fit the demand, as Ave eA'entually did 

 after World War I, it Avill mean feAver jobs, less buying power, fur- 

 ther reductions, and more shut-downs, and a spiraling deflation lead- 

 ing inevitably to deep depression, suffering, and Avant in the midst of 

 plenty. If Ave are able to develop means to consume our abundant 

 production, it will mean higher standards of living and stable pros- 

 perity. Russia is confidently expecting that Ave Avill follow the de- 

 pression route, and Ave must face the disturbing fact that we have al- 

 ways heretofore folloAved that route. We have neA'er yet learned to 

 develoj) sufficient buying power in like circumstances to prevent a 

 collapse. If Ave succeed this time, Ave Avill haA^e to employ quite differ- 

 ent techniques from any we have heretofore relied upon. We must 

 meet new problems in neAv Avays. We must recognize the interdei)end- 

 ence of all segments of our economy and approach the problem from 

 a national vieAV]ioint. We simply must not fail. 



The prcjblem ^vill require the cooperation of every segment of our 

 economy, but agriculture has a particularly important part to play. 

 Although farmers constitute only about one-fifth of our population, 



