GENERAL FARM PROGRAM 1041 



have been supported in such a way as to depress the outlet and price 

 of tung oil. The oils are not fully substitutable because of the limits 

 to the mixing ratios. As a result the Government price policy and 

 program appears to have placed a very disproportionate burden on 

 tung oil (exhibit B). That compares the prices of the three oils 

 prewar, during the war, and postwar. Under competitive conditions 

 for the finished product, paints, for example, any lowering of prices 

 has been largely passed to tung because both maximum mixing per- 

 centage and level of support price of the companion oil has been 

 relatively fixed. This should be corrected as a matter of fairness to 

 the tung industry in the application of the governmental price-support 

 policy. 



A final matter needs serious consideration. That is the nature of 

 the tung enterprise as a producer of essential industrial oil supply as a 

 part of national security and self-sufficiency. In contrast to the main 

 substitute oils, hnseed and soybean, which can be increased sub- 

 stantially in one crop season because they come from annual crops, 

 tung cannot be obtained in quantities short of about 5 years. Some 

 can be obtained in 3 years under best conditions, but this can hardly 

 be considered a safe plan. Thus, if there is any reasonable expecta- 

 tion of future need for tung on short notice the industry must be kept 

 in readiness. It cannot meet such a need effectively otherwise. This 

 is a very fundamental matter that should be taken into consideration 

 now in Government policy making relative to the domestic production 

 of essential commodities. 



The limitations of local area to deal with this problem: Since the 

 central problem is one of low price received by growers and the dis- 

 criminatory nature to tung under a Government pricing policy for 

 essential agricultural commodities this matter is beyond local action 

 for remedy. Local producers and research agencies seem to be able 

 to handle technical production problems. They are making sub- 

 stantial progress with their solutions. 



While some production adjustments could be made by local tung-nut 

 producers, they are still aware that it was but a short time ago that 

 Government action and influence encouraged them to get into the 

 industry. If they should give up on the enterprise now will the Gov- 

 ernment be back in a few years with inducements to get in again? 

 Will the Government change its price-support policies relative to 

 other oilseed crops within a short time so that tung will have a more 

 favorable competitive position with them? These are matters that 

 need positive actions now which must come from outside rather than 

 within the area. 



Government policy and program needed: To summarize, there are 

 several things on which definite action is needed in order to sustain 

 and assure the industry a permanent place in the economic life of the 

 area where it has made such substantial progress in recent years. 

 First, there is need for a comparable price policy for tung as is ex- 

 tended to the competitive oilseed crops. Second, in view of the present 

 Far East political situation, serious consideration should be given to a 

 positive, long-time program for the tung industry in the United 

 States. Third, the Government program should recognize the pe- 

 culiar situation for the tung industry, that it cannot get into produc- 

 tion on short notice if new orchards have to be brought in or neglected 

 orchards have to be restored. Finally, some plan of action now is 



