laration of a disaster by the Administrator pursuant to the Small 

 Business Act. 



In the latter context, the Small Business Act contains a very 

 strict and definite definition in section 3(k), which is in the record, 

 and I will not repeat it here. The legislative history of this provi- 

 sion indicates, with respect particularly to the fishing industry, 

 that it was intended to cover natural occurrences such as the El 

 Nino tide and that the phrase "ocean conditions resulting in the 

 closure of customary fishing waters" was intended to cover such 

 things as toxic algae blooms, commonly known as red tide or brown 

 tide. 



In the Massachusetts instance, the disaster request was based on 

 the issuance of emergency rules by the Secretary of Commerce as 

 recommended by the New England Fishery Management Council 

 through the National Marine Fisheries Service. 



The effect of these rules, issued and amended in January and 

 December of 1994, April 1995, and May 1996, was to close the cus- 

 tomary fishing areas of a substantial part of the fishing fleet in 

 Massachusetts. The cause for these actions was a serious depletion 

 of the groundfish stocks that resulted from overfishing for a num- 

 ber of years. 



This was not an unexpected or sudden occurrence. Overfishing 

 had gone on for some time, and the resulting consequences, prob- 

 lem, and cure were known throughout that entire period. Record 

 low catches had been reported every year since at least 1991. The 

 Department of Commerce informed us that the National Marine 

 Fisheries Service and the New England Fishery Management 

 Council, which included a representative of the Commonwealth of 

 Massachusetts, have been considering appropriate action to elimi- 

 nate the overfished condition of groundfish stocks — that is, tighter 

 restrictions on the fishing efforts in question — for at least the past 

 10 years. 



As you stated, Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that the fishing 

 industry in Massachusetts was hurt by the closure of their usual 

 fishing grounds. However, the economic suffering is not the con- 

 sequence of a sudden event, and is therefore not a disaster within 

 the statutory definition. 



Again, as you mentioned, in past years the statute had contained 

 two specific provisions for nonphysical disasters that would have 

 covered this particular occurrence. The first of these provided for 

 economic injury assistance in the event of what was called "eco- 

 nomic dislocation." This provision was repealed by Congress in 

 1981. 



The second provided for economic injury assistance resulting for 

 injury caused by Federal Government action. This provision was 

 repealed by Congress in 1986. The latter provision, definitely, and 

 perhaps the former as well, clearly would have covered the present 

 situation. 



Rather than repeat the rest of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, 

 since it will be considered part of the record, I would be happy to 

 answer any questions you might have. 



[Mr. Kulik's statement may be found in the appendix.] 



Chairman Torkildsen. Thank you, Mr. Kulik. We will hear tes- 

 timony from all witnesses, and then open the panel for questions. 



