no 



Mr. VVkldon. Thank you. Dr. Brass. 

 Dr. Gershwin, welcome. 



STATEMENT OF DR. l^WRENCE K. GERSHWIN, NATIONAL 

 INTELUGENCE COUNCIL 



Dr. Gershwin. Mr. Chairman. I would like to make a few re- 

 marks about some unique capabilities that the intelligence commu- 

 nity has brought to bear on this problem and some observations we 

 have on the Russian contamination issue. 



The intelligence community has published a number of classified 

 intelligence reports on the magnitude and nature of environmental 

 contamination in the former Soviet Union and that includes a na- 

 tional intelligence estin\ate produced last year. In June this year, 

 the CIA presented a classified report to several members of your 

 committee. 1 would like to just briefly mention a few highlights of 

 some of our analysis. 



Regarding the Yablokov Report. April 1993. that report obviously 

 presents a clear, credible picture oi the magnitude of the former 

 boviet and Russian radioactive waste dumping at sea. and the CIA 

 has. in many instances, corroborated that report. CIA analysis 

 shows that solid and liquid radioactive wastes were dumped and 

 that barges and ships that were possibly contaminated by or laden 

 with radioactive waste were, in fact, scuttled. 



Measurements indicate that the Arctic has also been contami- 

 nated by industrial sources. These pollutants include chemicals, 

 heavy metals, and organics and are generally transported into the 

 Arctic by atmospheric and water-borne paths and are generally ac- 

 cepted to be the primary components of what is known as Arctic 

 haze, a phenomenon similar to lower latitude smog. 



The CIA is aware of research being conducted on industrial con- 

 taminants in the Kara Sea. but I must defer comments on that 

 issue to a closed and classified session. 



Russian policy on nuclear waste is truly murky and subject to 

 sudden changes because of the large number of organizations in- 

 volved and constiintly changing laws and decrees, some of which, 

 in fact, are conflicting, as has already been obser^-ed today. Russia 

 has several laws and Government decrees that stipulate procedures 

 for accepting, handling, and disposing of nuclear wastes. 



One murky area is the acceptance of foreign nuclear waste, 

 which can be reprocessed but not permanently stored in Russia. 

 However. Russia's definition of permanent storage is unclear and 

 Moscow has not resolved whether or not it will accept nuclear 

 waste from other former Soviet States and countries with Russian 

 nuclear reactors. 



Some of the Russian Government's recent actions send a trou- 

 bling signal regarding Moscow's commitment to stopping nuclear 

 waste dumping in the Arctic waters. For example, a presidential 

 decree that was issued in July that has been referred to earlier re- 

 scinds an earlier edict that, in fact, established civilian oversight 

 of the militar>''s management of radioactive waste. This effectively. 

 by rescinding this, effectively allows the Russian military to police 

 its own dumping practices, uncontrolled by civilian authority. 



According to a report released recently by the Norsvegian en\'i- 

 ronmental group Bellona, which works closely with Russian envi- 



