Ill 



ronrnental groups, the main nuclear storage facility of Russia's 

 northern fleet is makeshift, dilapidated, and contains 1,000 times 

 more radiation than the largest of this year's French nuclear tests. 



While this report was being prepared, Bellona's offices in Mur- 

 mansk were raided by the Russian Federal security service, essen- 

 tially the successors to the KGB, which confiscated all of Bellona's 

 materials on radioactive waste generated by the northern fleet and 

 later called in for questioning many of Bellona's Russian contacts. 



Bellona's experience attests to the growing difficulties that West- 

 em and Russian environmental groups confront in trying to mon- 

 itor military nuclear waste management in the fact of nationalist 

 political pressures, skepticism about foreign involvement in mili- 

 tary matters, and especially the steady widening of the powers en- 

 joyed by Russia's internal security services, and this trend, we 

 think, is most worrisome. 



Turning to some of the intelligence community's activities, we 

 are now engaged in a number of new cooperative projects that 

 bring unconventional resources to bear on these issues. As part of 

 the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission effort, the United States and 

 Russia have agreed to share products derived from national intel- 

 ligence assets to help solve environmental problems of concern to 

 both countries. The proposed projects include a study of the Arctic. 



In addition to the intelligence community, prominent U.S. sci- 

 entists brought together by the Environmental Task Force are 

 playing an important role in this endeavor. As many of you may 

 be aware, the Environmental Task Force was established in 1992 

 to determine how our Nation's national security assets could help 

 answer key environmental questions in addition to fulfilling their 

 more standard intelligence and defense role. 



The ETF brought together a team of about 50 prominent U.S. en- 

 vironmental and global change scientists, now known as MEDEA, 

 who have been reviewing our most advanced reconnaissance sat- 

 ellite programs and Navy systems to determine what unique envi- 

 ronmental and global change information could be derived from 

 them. Working with both our intelligence and defense communities, 

 MEDEA conducted several demonstrations that addressed specific 

 environmental questions. 



I would like to summarize those aspects of this work that would 

 help address the environmental impact of radionuclide waste 

 dumping in the oceans. Although MEDEA has not yet conducted a 

 demonstration to determine specifically how national security sys- 

 tems could monitor radionuclide waste or help in risk assessment, 

 it has demonstrated a range of environmental capabilities of these 

 systems that have a direct bearing on their ability to provide such 

 information in the future. 



These capabilities fall into two broad categories. The first is the 

 ability to detect directly and monitor the location of toxic pollution, 

 either by observing the pollutant itself or by observing its effect on 

 the local environment. 



The second is the ability to provide information that can help 

 predict the transport of a pollutant both down rivers and siround 

 the oceans, and thus its potential impact on other locations. 



The best example of how our national security assets can monitor 

 pollutants directly and determine their potential impact on other 



