!54 INTRODUCTION. 



Of the Manner and Order of acquiring Knowledge. 



Although there is but one road to science, that to wit, 

 in which we proceed from things more known to things less 

 known, from matters more manifest to matters more obscure ; 

 and universals are principally known to us, science springing 

 by reasonings from universals to particulars; still the comprehen- 

 sion of universals by the understanding is based upon the per- 

 ception of individual things by the senses. Both of Aristotle's 

 propositions, therefore, are true : First, the one in his Physics, 1 

 where he says, " The way is naturally prepared, from those 

 things that are more obvious and clear to us, to those things 

 that are more obvious and clear by nature. For, indeed, the 

 same things are not both known to us and extant simply : 

 whence it is indispensable to proceed in this way, viz. from 

 those things that are of a more obscure nature, but to us are 

 more apparent, to those that are of a nature more obvious and 

 distinct. Now those things are, in the first instance, more 

 perspicuous and manifest to us that are most confused in fact ; 

 whence it is necessary to proceed from universals to particulars ; 

 for the whole, according to the dictates of sense, is the more ob- 

 vious ; and the universal is a certain whole." And again, that 

 other in his Analytics, 2 where he thus expresses himself : " Sin- 

 gulars are to us more known, and are the first that exist accord- 

 ing to the information of sense ; for, indeed, there is nothing in 

 the understanding which was not first in the sense. And 

 although that reasoning is naturally prior and more known 

 which proceeds by syllogism, still is that more perspicuous to 

 us which is based on induction. And therefore do we more 

 readily define singulars than universals, for there is more of 



1 Lib. i, c. 2, 3. 2 Post, 2. 



