INTRODUCTION. 155 



equivocation in universals : whence it is advisable from singu- 

 lars to pass to universals." 



All this agrees with what we have previously said, although at 

 first blush it may seem contradictory ; inasmuch as universals 

 are first imbibed from particulars by the senses, and in so far 

 are only known to us as an universal is a certain whole and in- 

 distinct thing, and a whole is known to us according to sense. 

 For though in all knowledge we begin from sense, because, as 

 the philosopher quoted has it, sensible particulars are better 

 known to sense, still the sensation itself is an universal thing. 

 For, if you observe rightly, although in the external sense the 

 object perceived is singular, as, for example, the colour which we 

 call yellow in the eye, still when this impression comes to be 

 made an abstraction, and to be judged of and understood by the 

 internal sensorium, it is an universal. Whence it happens that 

 several persons abstract several species, and conceive different 

 notions, from viewing the same object at the same time. This 

 is conspicuous among poets and painters, who, although they con- 

 template one and the same object in the same place at the same 

 moment, and with all other circumstances agreeing, neverthe- 

 less regard and describe it variously, and as each has conceived 

 or formed an idea of it in his imagination. In the same way, 

 the painter having a certain portrait to delineate, if he draw 

 the outline a thousand times, he will still give a different face, 

 and each not only differing from the other, but from the ori- 

 ginal countenance; with such slight variety, however, that 

 looking at them singly, you shall conceive you have still the 

 same portrait set before you, although, when set side by side, 

 you perceive how different they are. Now the reason is this : 

 that in vision, or the act of seeing itself, each particular is 

 clear and distinct; but the moment the object is removed, 

 as it is by merely shutting the eyes, when it becomes an ab- 

 straction in the fancy,, or is only retained in the memory, it 

 appears obscure and indistinct ; neither is it any longer appro- 



