160 INTRODUCTION. 



more excellent, more exquisite than they. Now it seems a 

 thing common to all animals, that they have a congenital 

 power of judging, which we call sense. Since sense is innate, 

 then, the things perceived by sense remain in some animals ; in 

 others they do not remain. Those in whom they do not re- 

 main, however, have either no knowledge at all, or at least 

 none beyond the simple perception of the things which do not 

 remain ; others, again, when they perceive, retain a certain 

 something in their soul. Now, as there are many animals of 

 this description, there is already a distinction between one ani- 

 mal and another; and to this extent, that in some there is reason 

 from the memory of things; and in others there is none. 

 Memory, therefore, as is said, follows from sense ; but from re- 

 peated recollection of the same thing springs experience (for 

 repeated acts of memory constitute a single experience). From 

 experience, however, or from the whole and universal stored 

 quietly in the mind, (one, to wit, in place of a multitude be- 

 cause in the whole crowd of particulars there is one and the 

 same universal,) is derived the principle of art and of science : 

 of art, if it belong to production (i. e. action) ; of science, if it 

 belong to that which is (i. e. the knowledge of entity) . Con- 

 sequently there are neither any definite habits that are innate, 

 nor any habits that are formed from other and more known 

 habits, but from sense." 



From which words of Aristotle it plainly appears by what 

 order or method any art or science is acquired, viz. The 

 thing perceived by sense remains ; from the permanence of the 

 thing perceived results memory ; from multiplied memory, ex- 

 perience; from experience, universal reason, definitions, and 

 maxims or common axioms, the most certain principles of know- 

 ledge ; for example, the same thing under like conditions can- 

 not be and not be ; every affirmation or negation is either true 

 or false ; and so on. 



Wherefore, as we have said above, there is no perfect know- 



