3 AGRICULTURAL DISCONTENT 



pany had the needed operating capital and had it been free from debt. A 

 small amount of grain was handled, but it was insufficient to net profits 

 and liquidate debts. The refusal of the Chicago Board of Trade to ad- 

 mit it on the exchange floor unquestionably hindered its marketing pro- 

 gram, but its unsound financial condition was no doubt a major cause for 

 its collapse. 30 Also, not to be lost sight of was the fact that the company 

 was organized at a time when grain prices were falling. When the United 

 States Supreme Court declared the Capper-Tincher Act constitutional, 

 those who felt that the "grain-growers plan" had not been given a fair 

 trial decided to start anew. This element was successful in launching the 

 Grain Marketing Company. 31 



The Grain Marketing Company met a similar fate. From the start, op- 

 position to it was strong. The members of the Chicago Board of Trade 

 opposed it; so did the McNary-Haugenites, who viewed the company as a 

 distinct threat to their program; wheat pool leaders looked upon it as a 

 rival, as did most farm organizations, which felt that "it was no child of 

 theirs." Spokesmen for the farmers, men like Henry C. Wallace and 

 Frank Lowden, opposed it. Its bitterest enemies "left no stone unturned"; 

 they demanded government investigations, appeared before blue-sky com- 

 missions, and charged it with not being "a true cooperative." But the 

 American Farm Bureau Federation and some of the state farm bureaus 

 supported it. 32 



The history of the Grain Marketing Company appears to have followed 

 a pattern familiar to cooperative failures. In 1924 several Chicago elevator 

 companies agreed to sell to the new company their fixed assets and grain,, 

 amounting to $16,000,000 and $10,000,000 respectively. What aroused the 

 suspicions of many was the fact that the men who sold their properties 

 to the company were generally considered hostile to the cooperative move- 

 ment. 33 The explanation offered for the acts of these merchants was that 



30. A.F.B.F., Weekly News Letter, November 16, 1922, p. i. 



31. Ibid., August 9, 1923, p. i; Filley, Cooperation in Agriculture, pp. 156-57. 



32. B. F. Goldstein, Marketing: A Farmers' Problem (New York, 1929), p. 240; 

 "Exit the Grain Marketing Company," Saturday Evening Post, CXCVIII (October 

 3, 1925), p. 30; "Why a $26,000,000 Marketing Project Won't Work," Literary 

 Digest, LXXXCI (August 8, 1925), p. 59; Filley, Cooperation in Agriculture, pp. 

 157-59; Senate Document 95, 70 Congress, i session, pp. 69-70, 312-13. 



33. Saturday Evening Post, CXCVIII (October 3, 1925), p. 30. 



