Mental Processes in Man. 325 



tion. Here the discriminated sense-impression is, to use 

 the words of Mr. Sully, " supplemented by an accompani- 

 ment or escort of revived sensations, the whole aggregate 

 of actual and revived sensations being solidified or inte- 

 grated into the form of a percept; that is, an apparently 

 immediate apprehension or cognition of an object now 

 present in a particular locality or region of space." * 

 Throughout the whole process of the formation of con- 

 structs by immediate association, and their definition by 

 examination, we were dealing with perception and percepts. 

 But when we reach the stage when particular qualities 

 were isolated, then we enter the field of conception. The 

 isolates are concepts. Class-names, reached through pro- 

 cesses involving isolation, stand for concepts. And com- 

 pleted constructions, involving synthesis of the results of 

 analysis, contain conceptual elements. The word " con- 

 cept," however, is used in different senses by different 

 authors. Mr. Sully says,f for example, ' " A concept, 

 otherwise called a general notion, or a general idea, is 

 the representation in our minds answering to a general 

 name, such as 'soldier,' 'man,' 'animal.' . . . Thus the 

 concept ' soldier ' is connected in my mind with the repre- 

 sentations of various individual soldiers known to me. 

 When I use the word ' soldier,' . . . what is in my mind 

 is a kind of composite image formed by the fusion or 

 coalescence of many images of single objects, in which 

 individual differences are blurred, and only the common 

 features stand out distinctly. . . . This may be called a 

 typical or generic image." But Noire, quoted by Professor 

 Max Miiller,} taking another illustration, says, " All trees 

 hitherto seen by me leave in my imagination a mixed 

 image, a kind of ideal presentation of a tree. Quite 

 different from this is my concept, which is never an image." 

 I follow Noire ; and I hold that the image, in so far as it 

 is an image, whether simple or composite, is a percept; 



'* " Outlines of Psychology," p. 153. f Ibid. p. 339, 



J " Science of Thought," p. 453. 

 For compound or generic ideas "not consciously fixed and signed by 



