332 Animal Life and Intelligence. 



mena, behind phenomena he cannot get. The materialist 

 resolves all phenomena into matter in motion or into 

 energy, and says that these are % the only real existences. 

 But they are no more real (they are a good deal less real 

 to most of us) than the phenomena with which he started. 

 How can the results of analysis be more real than that 

 which is analyzed ? Moreover, the matter and energy are 

 still phenomena, and involve, as such, the percipient mind. 

 Do what you will, you cannot get rid of the mental factor 

 in phenomena. 



It is possible that my use of the word " construct," my 

 saying that the object is a thing which each of us constructs 

 at the suggestion of certain sense-stimuli, may lead some 

 to suppose that the process is in some sense an arbitrary 

 one. This, however, would be a misconception. The 

 process under normal conditions is just as inevitable as is, 

 under .normal conditions, the fall of a stone to the ground. 

 The law of construction for human-folk is as much a law 

 of nature as the law of gravitation. Both laws are con- 

 densed statements of the facts of the case. There is 

 nothing arbitrary, lawless, or unnatural in the one or the 

 other ; the phrase merely emphasizes the essential presence 

 of the mental factor. 



If this principle be once thoroughly grasped, it will be 

 seen how shallow and misleading is the view that the 

 world is just reflected in consciousness unchanged as in a 

 mirror, or faithfully photographed as on a sensitive plate. 

 This is to reduce the human mind, which is surely no whit 

 less complex than the human body, to the condition of a 

 mere passive recipient instead of a vital and active agent 

 in the construction of man's world. 



The next point we have to consider is why we believe, 

 as you and I practically do believe, that the world of 

 phenomena exists as such, not merely for you and for me, 

 but for man. Is it not because we believe in the practical 

 unity of mankind ? Is it not because we believe that, 

 greatly as the conceptual and intellectual superstructure 

 may differ in different individuals, the perceptual basis 



