Mental Evolution. 465 



scious, or consciousness is something distinct from matter ; 

 and in the latter case, its presence in material forms is a 

 proof of the existence of conscious beings, outside of and 

 independent of what we term ' matter.' " 



There is a central core of truth in Mr. Wallace's 

 argument which I hold to be beyond question, though I 

 completely dissent from the conclusion which he draws 

 from it. I do not believe that the existence of conscious 

 beings, outside of and independent of what we term 

 " matter," is a tenable scientific hypothesis. In which 

 case, Mr. Wallace will reply, "You are driven on to the 

 other horn of the dilemma, and must hold the preposterous 

 view that all matter is conscious." 



Now, I venture to think that the use here of the word 

 " conscious " is prejudicial to the fair consideration of the 

 view which I hold in common with many others of far 

 greater insight than I can lay claim to. And it seems to 

 me that we cannot fairly discuss this question without the 

 introduction of terms which, from their novelty, are devoid 

 of the inevitable implications associated with " mind " and 

 " consciousness " and their correlative adjectives. Such 

 terms, therefore, I venture to suggest, not with a view to 

 their general acceptance, but to enable me to set forth, 

 without arousing at the outset antagonistic prejudice, that 

 hypothesis which alone, as it seems to me, meets the con- 

 ditions of the case. 



According to the hypothesis that is known as the 

 monistic hypothesis, the so-called connection between the 

 molecular changes in the brain and the concomitant states 

 of consciousness is assumed to be identity. Professor 

 Huxley suggested the term " neuroses " for the molecular 

 changes in the brain, and " psychoses " for the concomitant 

 states of consciousness. According to materialism, psychosis 

 is a product of neurosis ; but according to monism, neither 

 is psychosis a product of neurosis, nor is neurosis a product 

 of psychosis, but neurosis is psychosis. They are identical. 

 What an external observer might perceive as a neurosis of 

 my brain, I should at the same moment be feeling as a 



