468 Animal Life and Intelligence. 



According to these two attributes of the noumenal, 

 philosophy has to do with two streams of evolution the 

 subjective and the objective. Neither of them can be said 

 to be prior. . . . The two streams of evolution run parallel, 

 or, more correctly, the two are one stream, looked at from 

 two opposite shores." And again,* " Like Noire, I would 

 go hand-in-hand with Spinoza, and carry away with me 

 this permanent truth, that metakinesis can never be the 

 product of kinesis (materialism), nor kinesis the product of 

 metakinesis (spiritualism), but that the two are inseparable, 

 like two sides of one and the same substance." 



According to this view, the two distinct phenomenal 

 orders, the kinetic and the metakinetic, are distinct only 

 as being different phenomenal manifestations of the same 

 noumenal series. Matter, the unknown substance f of 

 kinetic manifestations, disappears as unnecessary ; spirit, 

 the unknown substance of metakinetic manifestations, also 

 disappears ; both are merged in the unknown substance of 

 being unknown, that is to say, in itself and apart from 

 its objective and subjective manifestations. 



It will, no doubt, be objected that the final identity of 

 ' ' neuroses and psychoses is an assumption. It is pure 

 assumption, it will be said, that these molecular nervous 

 processes, and those percepts and emotions which are their 

 concomitants, are simply different aspects, outer and inner, 

 objective and subjective, physiological and psychological, of 

 the same noumenal series. This must fully and freely be 

 admitted. Any and every explanation of the connection of 

 mind and body is based on an assumption. The common- 

 place view of two distinct entities, a mind which can act on 

 the body and a body which influences the mind, is a pure 

 assumption. The philosophic view, that there are two 

 entities, body and mind, that neither can act on the other, 

 but that there is a pre-established harmony between the 

 activities of the one and the activities of the other, is, again, 

 a pure assumption. The materialistic view, that matter 



* " Science of Thought," p. 279. 



t I use " substance " here in its philosophical sense. 



