Mental Evolution. 477 



dation that I form must ever be measured in terms of 

 my own subjective base-line. My conception of humanity 

 must always be, not only anthropomorphic, but idiomorphic. 



Once more, let it be remembered that the metakinesis 

 that rises to the level of consciousness is that which forms 

 the inner aspect of the neural kinesis of my brain or yours. 

 For each of us, then, that metakinesis is the only possible 

 metakinesis which we can know as such and at first-hand. 

 And for the pure idealist it is the only metakinesis which 

 he can know at all. Not so with us. We have assumed a 

 noumenal system of " things in themselves," of which all 

 phenomena, whether kinetic or metakinetic, are manifesta- 

 tions. We have assumed that kinesis cannot emerge into 

 the light of being without casting its inseparable metakinetic 

 shadow. We have assumed that when the kinetic mani- 

 festations assume the integrated and co-ordinated complexity 

 of nerve-processes in certain ganglia of the human brain, 

 the metakinetic manifestations assume the integrated and 

 co-ordinated complexity of human consciousness. Human 

 physiology is teaching us more clearly every day that all 

 human activities are, physically speaking, the outcome of 

 neural processes. Such neural processes are in us con- 

 scious. Therefore, granting our assumptions, the conclusion 

 that my neighbour is a conscious self, just as I am, is not 

 only legitimate, but (as we see from the daily conduct of 

 men) inevitable. In other words, certain kinetic phenomena 

 have for us inevitable metakinetic implications. 



Now, when we pass from man to the lower animals, 

 the metakinetic implications become progressively less in- 

 evitable and less forcible as the kinesis becomes more 

 dissimilar from that which obtains in the human organism. 

 The only metakinesis that we know directly is our own 

 human consciousness. In terms of this we have to in- 

 terpret all other forms of metakinesis. 



It is unnecessary to go over again the ground that has 

 already been covered in previous chapters, in which we 

 'have endeavoured to give some account of what seem to us 

 the legitimate inferences concerning the mental processes 



