Editor's Preface xi 



the field. Waller's forces had been reduced to a few hundred 

 horse, Essex's troops were diminished by disease and deser- 

 tion, and disheartened by failure, and the army of the Eastern 

 association was still in the process of formation. Even if the 

 march on London had been unattempted, a vigorous inva- 

 sion of the Eastern association might have made a breach in 

 that stronghold of Puritanism, and would almost certainly 

 have prevented the relief of Gloucester. The reasons which 

 led Newcastle to disobey the King's order are differently 

 stated. Warwick asserts that his desire to retain his inde- 

 pendent command was the chief motive. To this was added 

 the opposition of the gentlemen of Yorkshire to the proposed 

 scheme, their objections to leaving their own county, and 

 their urgent appeals to Newcastle to capture Hull and put a 

 stop to Fairfax's inroads into Yorkshire. It was on this last 

 ground that Newcastle based his refusal, but there is little 

 doubt that it coincided with his own inclinations 1 . From 

 the time that Newcastle turned back into Yorkshire his good 

 fortune ended. One day (October n, 1643) saw the defeat of 

 his field army at Winceby, and the rout of the besieging army 

 under the walls of Hull. November and December were spent 

 in recruiting his shattered forces, and in January 1644 he was 

 called northwards to oppose the entry of the Scots into Eng- 

 land. Slowly the Scots forced their way south, Newcastle 

 ever attempting to bring on a general action, and ever failing 

 through Lesly's judicious choice of positions. Though he 

 was able by means of his great superiority in cavalry to cut 

 off their provisions, he could never absolutely reduce them to 

 extremity, and his best horse were ruined by the severity of 

 the season. At the same time, he had to contend against 

 the criticisms of his own party, and even thought of laying 

 down his commission to escape their complaints. ' I per- 

 ceive ', wrote the King to him, ' that the Scots are not the 

 only, or the least enemies you contest with at this time ; where- 

 fore I must tell you in a word you must as much contemn the 

 impertinent or malicious tongues and pens of those that are 

 or profess to be your friends, as well as you despise the sword 

 of an equal enemy. The truth is, if either you or my Lord 

 Ethyn leave my service, I am sure all the north is lost. Remem- 

 ber all courage is not in fighting, constancy in a good cause 



1 See Clarendon, vii, 177, and passages quoted on p. 29. 



