Mental Processes in Man. 327 



about their words, or the objects for which they stand, 

 conceptual elements are sure to crowd in. 



There is one more feature of these mental processes in 

 man, and that by no means the least important, that 

 remains for brief consideration. I began by saying that 

 the primary end and object of the reception of the influences 

 of the external world, or environment, is to enable the 

 organism to answer to them in activity. We saw that the 

 sight of an orange suggests, through association, its taste ; 

 and that the validity of the association could be verified by 

 going to the orange and tasting it. We saw, too, that 

 when I heard a dog howl in the street, and, going to the 

 window, saw a small boy with a stone in his hand, I con- 

 cluded that he was going to throw it at the dog. What I 

 wish now to elicit is that out of perceptions through asso- 

 ciation there arise certain expectations, and that the 

 activities of organisms are moulded in accordance with 

 these expectations. 



It is clear that these expectations or anticipations 

 belong partly to the presentative or constructive order, and 

 partly to the reconstructive or representative order. They 

 are in some cases directly suggested by the presentations 

 of sense ; they are also built up out of representations 

 which have become associated with the constructs in 

 memory and through experience. But what we have here 

 especially to notice about them is that, in the latter case, 

 they involve more or less distinctly the element which we, 

 in the language of our developed thought, call causation. 

 There is a sequence of events, and the perception of certain 

 of these gives rise, through association and experience, to 

 an expectation of certain succeeding phenomena. Expecta- 

 tions are, therefore, the outcome of the linked nature of 

 phenomena. And when we come eventually to think about 

 the phenomena, and how they are linked together into a 

 chain (successional) or web (coexistent), we reach the con- 

 ception of causation as the connecting thread. In early 

 stages of the mental process, such a conception does not 

 emerge. Nevertheless, the phenomena are perceived as 



