414 Animal Life and Intelligence. 



sideration in another work. In the mean while we may, 

 I think, confidently assume that ethics, like conceptual 

 thought and aesthetics, are beyond the reach of the brute. 

 Morality is essentially a matter of ideals, and these belong 

 to the conceptual sphere. 



I have now said enough * to indicate what I mean by 

 advocating the exercise of extreme caution in our inferences 

 concerning the emotional states of animals. We must 

 remember, first, how liable to error are our inferences in 

 these matters ; we must remember, next, how complex and 

 essentially human are our own emotions. I do not for one 

 moment deny that in animals are to be found the perceptual 

 germs of even the higher emotional states. Nevertheless, 

 if we employ, in our interpretation of the actions of animals, 

 such terms as " consciousness of guilt," " sense of right 

 and wrong," "idea of justice," " deceitfulness," "revenge," 

 " vindictiveness," "shame," and the rest, we must not 

 forget that these terms stand for human products, that they 

 are saturated with conceptual thought, and that they must 

 be to a large extent emptied of their meaning before they 

 can become applicable to the emotional consciousness of 

 brutes. 



* I have said nothing about the emotions of invertebrates, because I have 

 nothing special to say. They have, no doubt, emotions analogous to fear, 

 anger, and so on. But it is difficult to interpret their actions. The " angry " 

 wasp is, perhaps, a good deal more frightened than furious. Sir John 

 Lubbock's interesting experiments seem to show that ants have what is 

 termed the instinct of play. But this admirable observer has rendered it 

 probable that sympathy and affection in ants and bees have been somewhat 

 exaggerated. 



