THE GOOD AND THE BAD OF TRUSTS 131 



for stifling competition or the continual "buying out" of 

 would be rivals. 



Not only is it denied that consolidation secures no 

 decrease of fixed charges over independent concerns possessing 

 sufficient capital, but it is argued that an established monop- 

 oly will suffer actual loss from listless and unprogressive 

 management. As the New York Journal of Commerce rightly 

 insists, "it is not to be denied that such concentrations of 

 management will be subject to countervailing offsets from 

 the absence of the stimulus of competition; from the uncer- 

 tainty about the management falling into the best possible 

 hands; from the discouragement to invention which always 

 attends monopoly ; and from the possibility that the adminis- 

 tration may be intrusted to 'friends' rather than to experts." 

 And the existence of such drawbacks is admitted by many 

 of those who believe combination to be desirable and inevit- 

 able. As Professor Clark suggests, an established monopoly, 

 secure in the possession of the markets of a large country, 

 "would not need to be forever pulling out its machines and 

 putting in better," so that, as compared with countries where 

 industry is upon a competitive basis, such a combination 

 would fall behind in the struggle for international trade. In 

 ruthlessly and unceasingly displacing expensive machinery 

 with newer and better appliances, American manufac- 

 turers have probably led the world; but monopolies will 

 inevitably feel reluctant to continue such an energetic policy 

 of improvement. As combinations obtain a greater age, 

 they will persist in old and established methods; while nepo- 

 tism and favoritism, tending towards hereditary office- 

 holding will replace the energetic management that some 

 of the trusts now display. Andrews is correct in holding 

 that the quest for able and progressive management, which 

 often marks the efforts of existing trusts to make their domi- 

 nating position secure, is no argument against the probability 

 of future apathy when monopolies have been long established. 



Here we may refer to two of the alleged advantages of 

 trusts. It is said that combinations develop abler manage- 

 ment through the opportunity they afford for a specializa- 

 tion of skill upon the part of their officials, and that efficiency 



