2o8 PHILANDER C. KNOX 



was 98 per cent of the whole. The Supreme court decided 

 that as the monopoly was in the production or manufacture 

 of sugar, and its sale or distribution among the states and to 

 foreign countries was but incidental thereto, it was not within 

 the prohibition of the law, saying that manufacturing, al- 

 though it precedes commerce, is not a part of it, and that 

 the act only applied to restraints of commerce. 



This distinction is easily understood when it is recollected 

 that commerce means intercourse, transmission, communi- 

 cation, transportation; and commerce among the states, the 

 regulation of which rests in the federal power, means, as the 

 term implies, that this intercourse shall be between or among 

 the states. Manufacturing, on the other hand, does not 

 imply or necessitate intercourse among the states, but implies 

 a situs or place for its operations. In a subsequent case the 

 government destroyed a combination known as the Addyston 

 Pipe combination, but upon the ground that it was a con- 

 spiracy among independent producers of pipe to restrain its 

 sale and distribution among the states. The combination in 

 this case operated directly upon interstate commerce. 



These cases seem to define the scope of the anti-trust law 

 and show how little there is now left for the statute to operate 

 upon. It is not enough, it seems, that a trust or corporation 

 owning corporations exists, or that it is engaged in interstate 

 or foreign commerce, for its mere engaging in commerce is 

 not prohibited, or that it monopolizes production throughout 

 the country, or that it is formed to restrain or monopolize 

 business within a state, or destroys competition in buying or 

 selling within a state, or that by any of these things it indi- 

 rectly affects interstate commerce with a practical restraint 

 or monopoly, to bring the corporation or its particular trans- 

 action within the emphatic clauses or under the drastic penal- 

 ties of the anti-trust law. What seems to be necessary is to 

 establish by legal proof in court a combination for the direct 

 monopolizing or restraining of what is strictly interstate com- 

 merce, and to prove this against combinations whose affairs 

 are conducted upon the best legal advice as to what is and 

 what is not obnoxious to the law, by methods secret or ingen- 

 iously contrived to avoid the letter of the law. 



