220 PHILANDER C. KNOX 



to be supplied in the best order to the consumer, the Supreme 

 court of Pennsylvania said: 



"This is denied by the defendants, but it seems to us it is 

 immaterial whether these positions are sustained or not. Ad- 

 mitting their correctness, it does not follow that these advan- 

 tages redeem the contract from the obnoxious effects so strik- 

 ingly presented by the referee. The important fact is that 

 these companies control this immense coal field ; that it is the 

 great source of supply of bituminous coal to the state of New 

 York and large territories westward; that by this contract 

 they control the price of coal in this extensive market, and 

 make it bring sums it would not command if left to the natural 

 laws of trade; that it concerns an article of prime necessity 

 for many uses ; that its operation is general in this large region, 

 and affects all who use coal as a fuel, and this is accomplished 

 by a combination of all the companies engaged in this branch 

 of business in the large region where they operate. The com- 

 bination is wide in scope, general in its influence, and in- 

 jurious in effects. These being its features, the contract is 

 against public policy, illegal, and, therefore, void." 



The question of reasonableness is thus one for the courts 

 to determine, and it is manifest that this doctrine gives play 

 to just considerations of the freedom and inviolability of con- 

 tracts with proper judicial safeguards against unconscionable 

 arrangements rightly void as contrary to public policy. The 

 Sherman act is entitled "an act to protect trade and com- 

 merce against unlawful restraints," etc., and the able dissent- 

 ing opinion in one of the leading cases in the Supreme court 

 argues from this indication and other considerations that the 

 restraints intended to be stricken off were only those un- 

 reasonable restraints as defined at common law. But the 

 law was authoritatively decided to include all restraints, 

 whether reasonable or unreasonable. Nevertheless, in ex- 

 tending the law it might be deemed wise by congress not to 

 import and impose this distinction clearly, for the following 

 reasons among others: Because the hard and fast extreme 

 rule may work injustice in various instances where a moderate 

 restraint is either not harmful at all to the general interests, 

 or only slightly so in comparison with the importance of the 



