HOW CONGRESS MAY CONTROL TRUSTS. 



BY JEREMIAH W. JENKS. 



[Jeremiah W. Jenks, economist; born St. Clair, Mich., Sept. 2, 1856; graduated 

 University of Michigan, 1878; studied law and was admitted to the Michigan bar; 

 instructor in Greek, Latin, and German at Mount Morris college, 1881-85; professor 

 of political science, Knox college, 1886-89; professor of political economy and social 

 science Indiana university, 1889-91; expert agent of the United States industrial 

 commission for investigation of trusts and industrial combinations, 1899-1901, 

 since which time he has been consulting expert of the United States department of 

 labor on that subject; was sent by the war department of the United States as a 

 special commissioner to investigate economic policies and conditions in the Orient, 

 1901-02. Author of The Trust Problem, Trusts and Industrial Combinations, Vol. 

 VIII., Report Industrial Commission on Industrial Combinations in Europe, etc.] 



It is generally conceded that state action to control trusts 

 is and must be ineffective owing to differing laws in separate 

 states. Congress, in the Sherman anti-trust law, has taken 

 one step toward their control. The best legal authorities who 

 have given special study to the question are of the opinion 

 that, without constitutional amendment, congress may now 

 take further positive and effective action. The question re- 

 mains, What action is wisest? Three important suggestions 

 have been made; we attempt to weigh briefly their relative 

 merits. 



1. Attorney General Knox made a notable address at 

 Pittsburg, in which, with the acumen as well as the caution of 

 a great lawyer, he told what the present government had 

 done in restraining trusts, and indicated in general terms 

 what more congress might do. He seems to have amplified 

 the views of the president. Although his recommendations 

 were not specific, his suggestions seem to mean this: 



(a) Under the Sherman act it has been decided that 

 combinations in restraint of interstate commerce, whether 

 reasonable or unreasonable, are illegal and punishable. In 

 his judgment — and in this judgment most thoughtful men 

 since the decision in the Addyston Pipe case agree — it is wise 

 to permit any partial or even complete restraints of trade 

 that are in their nature reasonable, while punishing severely 

 those that are unreasonable. The courts, as under the com- 



222 



